Developments in Russia-Ukraine War
The Russia-Ukraine war has been marked by a visible increase in the use of hybrid warfare by both sides. In recent times, Russia innovated in ballistic missile and drone upgrades which were successfully able to evade Ukraine’s air defenses and strike within Ukraine. Through its hybrid warfare mode, Russia has also been able to launch a series of minor offensives over the past two months to test the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern frontiers. Their success in rattling the NATO and Ukraine have propelled Russia to continue these tactics, without risking any direct military confrontation. Prior to the onset of winter, Russia has intensified these tactics to put Ukraine under renewed pressure.
At least three direct outcomes are visible from the present trajectory:
First, they may have given Russia an illusionary sense of confidence. Military breakthroughs and psychological upmanship in gaming the adversary tends to do that. But without any decisive victory, it not only remains illusionary, but also prevents attempts at peace. That is, likely, why despite attempts at outreach by the Trump administration to host a Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest, as a follow-up to their Alaska summit, the efforts ended in a failure.
The upshot of this failure was the hardening of diplomatic lines, as the U.S. was quick to impose sanctions on Russia’s two large oil companies.[1] This, in turn, ensured that consistent buyers of Russian oil began to drawdown their purchases. Russia, in turn, in a show of recalcitrance, announced the deployment of the nuclear-propelled Burevestnik cruise missile. The U.S. responded by indicating that it would now begin nuclear testing once again. This fast pace of militarization has not deterred Russia or brought it to the negotiating table. This shows that Russia has now firmly embarked on a self-destructive trajectory, propelled by a false sense of impending victory, in which it is killing all chances of even a basic ceasefire. That Russia has repeatedly rejected a temporary ceasefire in favour of a permanent political settlement reinforces its disdain for peace attempts and reveals its pan-European imperialist ambition.
Second, it has resulted in greater militarization in, both, Russia and Ukraine. That, despite the strain on its economy, resources and manpower, Russia is still able to innovate to sustain the war, shows the intensive effort being put into militarization. However, what is more significant is the fact that Ukraine is responding in equal, if not greater measure, thereby placing it on a trajectory towards a strong and permanent nationhood which it will not be possible to shake in the future.
Since the start of the war in 2022, Ukraine’s defence sector has grown by almost 350 percent. The country is now becoming a leading innovation hub. It leads globally in tactical and long-range drones, aiming to become the world’s “drone capital”, and is also taking a lead in AI-driven autonomous warfare. This innovation is not only based on latest technology but is also low-cost and based on rapid model of production, thereby giving Ukraine asymmetric advantage that has advanced its capability to strike deep within Russia.
Third, changing military capacity and balance of power – which ensures that Russia cannot score a decisive victory – shows that the question of Ukraine needing to join NATO for its own security is now in a reverse mode. In fact, the present reality indicates that it is NATO, and especially the European countries, that need Ukraine more. Despite not formally being a part of NATO, Ukraine, through its various programmes and initiatives,[2] has been able to successfully integrate itself with Western defence firms, becoming a fertile field for NATO to trial and test weapons in live combat conditions for rapid integration. This has made Ukraine’s defence sector a kind of bulwark for European security, as it ensures that Ukraine becomes a source for supplying cost-effective, battle-proven technologies that enhance NATO, thereby solidifying Ukraine as Europe’s defensive backbone.
Technology and Politics
The increasing proliferation of AI models has led to their rapid adoption across public and private spaces. That this rapid proliferation has coincided with the rise of techno-nationalism and the receding of the age of liberal globalization, has made the political potential of these AI models particularly susceptible to misuse. In India, these risks are now being acknowledged. In recent times, various government departments are moving en masse to indigenous digital platforms using AI models.
They have flagged the risk of foreign AI models misusing the data provided to them. Such data could be used by these AI models to glean more information about decision-making, priorities of government, planning and other critical information. This now constitutes a major gap and vulnerability that the government is looking to bridge, as it directly compromises national security.
Apart from India, China is also embarking on a path towards self-reliance, as it seeks to indigenize chip production, and reduce reliance on the U.S. To that effect, it has sought to provide electricity subsidies to run large data centres which would eventually support major AI models. A major reason for providing these subsidies is the fact that domestic chip making units still run on lower energy efficiency standards, thereby making them more expensive. To offset this, China has decided not to provide subsidies to data centres that use chips made by American companies, whom China has accused of compromising the country’s security. As the AI race, thus, heats up, both great power politics as well as security considerations have begun to redefine country priorities.
US-China Relations: Temporary Bridges
If there is one event, in recent times, where the massive gap between rhetoric and reality is so thoroughly camouflaged by rhetoric as to completely render the facts ambiguous, it is the recent summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea. Trump had attempted to influence the public discourse to showcase renewed cooperation between the U.S. and China in a bid to project normalization. Not only this, but he had also referred to the two countries as “G2” or the group of two, invoking the idea that both are superpowers. As eager as Trump was, Mr. Xi’s sense of disengagement was visible. Even the optics could not hide the fact that the meeting, instead of producing any concrete positive outcome, was merely instrumental in halting the spiralling negative outcomes of the recent U.S.-China tensions.
At least two implications were clearly visible:
First, this meeting was merely a trade ceasefire, and this temporary ceasefire does not appear to be meant to give way to any broader agreement but merely provides the space to the two powers to bide their time and prepare for alternative scenarios. For the U.S., this temporary agreement – wherein China agreed to lift export controls on rare earths for a year – represents breathing space where the US realizes that it needs to aggressively cultivate its own rare earth processing capacity, as well as look for alternative countries which possess these reserves. The U.S. would now be interested in accelerating investments and acquisitions in these countries. That is what sparked temporary U.S. interest in Pakistan. It is now more seriously investing in Brazil, as the latter is working on expanding its capacity in this area. The objective of the U.S. is to reduce dependence on China, as these rare earths are critical components of defence production as well.
For China, the objective was to ensure that restrictions on semiconductor exports, imposed by the U.S., are lifted. At the same time, China is also actively working to reduce its dependence on the U.S. This is visible in the fact that it is actively subsidizing its AI and chip companies, giving them incentives to indigenize chip production. It has also refused to buy chips from Nvidia – one of the biggest American tech conglomerates for which China used to be a critical market – accusing it of weaponizing its chips to compromise security. Even if the quality of chips is not world class, for now China is prioritizing insulating itself from the U.S. more thoroughly. Already, the U.S. no longer represents a very big direct market for China, as was visible in the little impact that Trump’s tariffs had.
Second, for both the countries, trade now no longer relates to the debate on interdependence versus delinking from each other. Rather, it has become a domain of selective weaponization by each side. In this sense, much like everything else (such as environment and technological innovation) trade has also been subordinated to great power politics. In this game of selective weaponization, both sides are using high-value channels of exchange – such as, technology, materials, and capital – as instruments to shape the other’s behaviour. Each side, thus, exploits the persistence of trade ties to impose costs and extract concessions.
The recent U.S.-China thaw should, therefore, be seen for what it is – a temporary truce in inevitable great power rivalry, rather than a step towards bringing back reliable globalized supply chains. That ship has long sailed.
- Lukoil and Rosneft are the two biggest oil companies. The U.S. decision saw a quick drop in their market values. India responded by drawing down on its purchase of Russian oil, as if it was waiting for an opportunity to do so, while other buyers like Turkey and China are expected to use this to their advantage. ↑
- Such as Brave1, Defense City, and Test. ↑
