The recently held state assembly elections in Maharashtra and Jharkhand cement the trend of the deepening hold of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) at the state level. While the party came back with a massive majority in Maharashtra reversing the losses incurred by it in the Lok Sabha elections earlier this year, it continues to remain in Opposition in Jharkhand although it has retained its vote-share in the latter. In the face of the concerted Hindu unity push by the BJP, the Maharashtra results have dealt a blow to existing powerbrokers in the state, including the politically opportunistic opposition alliance, Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA), and the divisive caste-based Maratha quota demonstrators who had sought to polarize the politics in the state.
A Broad Consolidation of Victory
Maharashtra:
The Maharashtra elections were fought by two broad coalitions, each of which consisted of breakaway factions of two major regional parties – Shiv Sena and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) – allied to BJP and Congress each. Since the divisions that took place in each of the two parties over the course of the past year, and the endless litigation that followed on the question of who the real parties are, the present elections were like a referendum to decide on the legitimacy of the breakaway factions. The victorious Mahayuti coalition was led by the BJP and consisted of Eknath Shinde-led Shiv Sena (SHS) and Ajit Pawar-led NCP. The Opposition alliance, MVA, consisted of Congress, Uddhav Thackrey-led Shiv Sena (SS-UBT) and Sharad Pawar-led NCP(SP).
| Seat share | Vote share (%) | |||
| 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 (percentage points) | |
| MVA[1] | 50 | -103 | 35.2 | -11.1 |
| Mahayuti[2] | 234 | +109 | 49.3 | 4.3 |
| Independents | 2 | -4 | 7.2 | 4.8 |
| Others | 2 | -2 | 8.3 | 2.1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
The vote shares and seat shares of the two alliances reflect the massive victory won by the Mahayuti. Within Mahayuti, the BJP alone got 132 seats, becoming the single largest party in the state, while its coalition partners, Shiv Sena and NCP received 57 and 41 seats respectively. Within the Opposition MVA alliance, the Congress received only 16 seats, while SS-UBT and NCP-SP were reduced to 20 and 10 seats respectively.
Even the strike rates (seats won relative to seats contested) of the ruling Mahayuti alliance were impressive, with BJP recording a strike rate of over 90%, Shiv Sena with strike rate of over 70% and NCP with a strike rate of nearly 70%. In contrast, within the Opposition MVA alliance, Congress’s strike rate was just up to 16%, SS-UBT’s strike rate was hovering at around 21% and NCP-SP’s strike rate was the worst at around 12%, recording Sharad Pawar’s one of the worst performances in his political career.
Jharkhand:
In Jharkhand, the incumbent INDIA state government led by Hemant Soren’s Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) gave its strongest performance yet. However, it is significant that this performance came not at the expense of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), but at the expense of smaller, third parties.
| Seat share | Vote share (%) | |||
| 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 | |
| INDIA[3] | 56 | +9 | 44.3 | +9 |
| NDA[4] | 24 | -1 | 38.1 | +4 |
| Others | 1 | -8 | 17.6 | -13 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
From the vote share and seat share distribution, it is clear that both INDIA and NDA increased their vote shares at the expense of smaller, third parties, with INDIA gaining more. In terms of seat share also, while NDA lost just one seat due to the loss faced by BJP’s ally, All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU) which won only one out of the ten seats it contested, the INDIA bloc gained eight out of nine seats at the expense of smaller, third parties.
Amongst the most significant takeaways is that despite the momentous win of INDIA bloc, BJP has emerged as the single-largest party in terms of vote share, with a vote share of 33.2%. This is followed by JMM’s vote share of 23.4%. There is nearly a gap of ten percentage points between the two. It shows that BJP has been pulled down due to lack of strong allies.
Performance in reserved seats in Jharkhand:
| INDIA | NDA | Others | ||||||||||
| 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 | |||||||
| Seat share | Vote share (%) | Seat share | Vote share (%) | Seat share | Vote share (%) | Seat share | Vote share (%) | Seat share | Vote share (%) | Seat share | Vote share (%) | |
| ST | 27 | 50.7 | +2 | +7.7 | 1 | 35.1 | -1 | +0.8 | 0 | 14.3 | -1 | -8.4 |
| SC | 5 | 44 | +2 | +11.6 | 4 | 40.1 | -2 | +2.5 | 0 | 15.9 | 0 | -14.1 |
| GEN | 24 | 41.3 | +5 | +9.1 | 19 | 39.2 | +1 | +5.9 | 1 | 19.4 | -7 | -15.1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
Even from performance in the reserved seats, it is clear that NDA lost out particularly in the ST-dominated seats. While the gap is narrower in SC-dominated seats and in General/Unreserved seats, the failure of BJP to mobilize the tribals has been the main cause of its defeat in the state. Despite focusing on issues such as infiltration from Bangladesh and attempting Hindu consolidation on the basis of tribal culture, the NDA lost in 27 out of the 28 ST-reserved seats it contested across Jharkhand, out of which BJP had contested 25 seats. The lone seat it won was Seraikella due to Champai Soren. It had won three ST-reserved seats in 2019. This time it lost Khunti and Torpa seats to JMM. This is despite the fact that RSS affiliates like Vanvasi Kalyan Ashrams – who have been engaging the tribals across the country – have been working since many decades to wean the tribals away from Christianity.
Region-wise Vote Share:
Maharashtra:
In terms of the regional spread of vote shares, the ruling Mahayuti dominated north Maharashtra, Konkan and western Maharashtra with over 50% vote share. It also dominated metropolis centers like Mumbai-Thane (with 49% vote share) and rural Congress’s bastion of Vidarbha (with 48.1% vote share).
| MVA (%) | Mahayuti (%) | Others (%) | ||||
| 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 | |
| Konkan | 39.5 | -4.1 | 50.9 | 2.3 | 9.6 | 1.8 |
| Marathawada | 35.7 | -8.1 | 45.3 | 11.8 | 19 | -3.7 |
| Mumbai-Thane | 34.1 | -7.1 | 49 | 0.6 | 16.9 | 6.5 |
| North Maharashtra | 28.5 | -16.4 | 53.5 | 8.1 | 18 | 8.3 |
| Vidarbha | 36.1 | -9.4 | 48.1 | 6.4 | 15.8 | 3 |
| Western Maharashtra | 37.1 | -7.1 | 50.7 | 7.3 | 12.2 | -0.1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
The ruling Mahayuti’s dominance across regions was further cemented by its victory in the Marathawada region, which has been the epicenter of Maratha quota protests. Incidentally, this became the region from which the Mahayuti gained the sharpest increase in its vote share, showing that the consolidation of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) had worked in its favour besides the fact that even Marathas voted for the Mahayuti in significant numbers. Consequently, the Mahayuti registered a sweep by winning 40 out of 46 seats in the Marathawada region,[5] while the MVA secured merely 5 seats in the region.[6] This was a great rebound from the Mahayuti’s performance in the Lok Sabha elections where it won just 1 out of 8 seats from the region.
Further, even in seats with high Muslim presence, the Mahayuti performed better than the MVA, gaining 40% vote share (an increase of 4.4 percentage points over 2019) compared to MVA’s 38% vote share (a loss of 14.2 percentage points over 2019).
In the case of both Marathawada victory despite the odds of quota agitation and the victory in Muslim-dominated seats, one of the main reasons was consolidation among the Hindus. Extensive campaigns by Yogi Adityanath and PM Modi through slogans such as ‘Batenge toh katenge’ and ‘Ek hain toh safe hain’ have worked well to unite the Hindus across caste, class and regional divides.
Jharkhand:
In Jharkhand, while BJP was able to make up for some of its vote share through urban dominated seats where NDA received 49% vote compared to INDIA’s 40.4%, it was not enough to offset INDIA’s win across semi-urban and rural seats as well as across the various regions.
| INDIA (vote share %) | NDA (vote share %) | Others (vote share %) | ||||
| 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 | 2024 | Change from 2019 | |
| Santhal Pargana | 52.2 | 12.6 | 38.3 | 1.5 | 9.5 | -14.1 |
| North Chotanagpur | 38.3 | 8 | 39.7 | 7 | 21.9 | -15 |
| Kolhan | 46.1 | 3.4 | 36 | 5.3 | 17.8 | -8.8 |
| South Chotanagpur | 48.2 | 10.8 | 37.6 | 2.4 | 14.2 | -13.2 |
| Palamu | 39 | 10.1 | 36.8 | 0.9 | 24.2 | -11 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
While the NDA gained minor vote share across all regions, instead of losing votes, the gains have not been enough to make a difference to seat shares. Particularly jarring has been NDA’s inability to win tribal votes in the Santhal Pargana region, where INDIA bloc received more than 50% vote share enabling it to win 17 out of 18 seats in the region, despite heavy campaigning by the NDA and putting in the best efforts. Here it is significant to note that as per official data submitted by the Government of India in an affidavit in Jharkhand High Court, the tribal population of the Santhal Pargana region has declined by 16%, while the Muslim population has increased by 20% to 40% in six districts of this region and the number of Christians in the region has increased by 6000 times (Ranjan, 2024).
This changing demography might help explain why despite vigorous campaigning, BJP struggled to beat JMM across the state, but especially in Santhal Pargana.
Caste and Community Voting Patterns
Maharashtra:
Hindu unity was a major factor in voters’ psyche, and this has reflected in the caste and community-wise voting patterns across the state.
Vote share across caste and community (%):
| MVA | Mahayuti | Others | |
| Upper caste | 25 | 63 | 12 |
| Maratha-Kunbi | 32 | 54 | 14 |
| Other OBCs | 26 | 60 | 14 |
| SCs | 25 | 34 | 41 |
| Adivasis | 56 | 39 | 5 |
| Muslims | 55 | 22 | 23 |
| Others | 31 | 51 | 18 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
The Mahayuti received significant support across all caste groups, enabling it to forge a larger framework of Hindu unity. Even within Mahayuti, the BJP saw a rise in support from Marathas as well as the OBCs, besides the upper caste vote. While the Dalits voted for the Mahayuti in lesser numbers, they did not even vote overwhelmingly for the MVA, instead voting for other smaller parties. This was particularly true for the politically aware Buddhist Dalits and those belonging to the Mahar caste. The Adivasi support for the Mahayuti too was lukewarm, and their votes went majorly to the MVA.
Jharkhand:
Caste and community-wise vote shares in Jharkhand show immense division among the Hindu votes, and a consolidation of minority and tribal votes in favour of INDIA bloc, likely influenced by demographic changes in the states.
Vote share across caste and community (%):
| INDIA | NDA | JLKM | Others | |
| Upper caste | 19 | 66 | 2 | 12 |
| OBC | 26 | 47 | 15 | 13 |
| Dalit | 38 | 39 | 2 | 21 |
| Oraon | 72 | 20 | – | 8 |
| Santhal | 42 | 48 | 5 | 5 |
| Munda | 60 | 25 | 3 | 11 |
| Other ST | 55 | 31 | – | 15 |
| Muslims | 90 | 6 | 1 | 3 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
While the NDA managed to garner support across upper castes and OBCs, the Dalit votes got almost evenly divided. Among all the tribal categories, INDIA bloc outperformed the NDA, while Muslims – whose population has rapidly increased in Jharkhand to nearly 24% (TOI, 2024) – voted almost entirely for the INDIA bloc. Within the tribals, the increasing proportion of Christians may have led to adverse outcomes for the NDA. Within the Oraon tribal group, INDIA bloc received 72% vote share. It is interesting to note that Oraon is not only the largest tribal group in Jharkhand, but nearly a third of its population is Christian. Same is the case with the Munda tribe – which has over 33% Christians – where INDIA bloc received 60% vote share. Among the Santhals, while Christians are less than 10%, the vote got divided like in the case of Dalits.
Key Takeaways
The Maharashtra and Jharkhand election results have heralded new equations for both the states. In Maharashtra, the results indicate the disruption of the political equations that have dominated state-level politics over the last few decades. In Jharkhand, what may appear innocuously as a continuity of the incumbent government is underlaid by the sinister emergency of long-term demographic change which the national political leaders urgently need to act on.
The following are some of the important takeaways that will resonate in the years to come:
First, the Maharashtra elections have cemented the legitimacy of the new political configurations that have taken place over the last two years. The question over the ‘real’ Shiv Sena and the ‘real’ NCP that has faced endless litigation in the courts and at the hands of the Speaker has finally been decisively answered by the voters. Shinde-led Shiv Sena had fought the battle on the plank that Uddhav had lost touch with the real Hindutva ideology of Shiv Sena by allying with the Congress and with Sharad Pawar’s NCP-SP, and that he had betrayed Bal Thackrey’s legacy. This has resonated with the voters. In the case of NCP too, Sharad Pawar’s attempts to undercut Ajit Pawar and his blatant nepotism, arrogance and opportunism made him the biggest loser of this election.
Second, the Maharashtra elections showed the limitations of political opportunism that was expediently being practiced by the MVA in a bid to fool the voters, which is symptomatic of the larger malaise in the INDIA alliance even at the national level – an alliance merely formed to prevent the division of anti-BJP votes, but without any ideology or concrete appeal. In Maharashtra, this farce of political opportunism – and explicit minority appeasement – outweighed the drama to receive public sympathy in the wake of splits in Uddhav’s Shiv Sena and Sharad Pawar’s NCP. The latter was short-lived in the minds of the people and soon the public was reminded of the real reason for the turbulence in Maharashtra politics over the past few years – the original betrayal of the 2019 state elections mandate by Uddhav Thackrey based on the egregious assumption that BJP did not stand a chance in Maharashtra without him. It was because of this unmitigated calculation and opportunism that Uddhav decided to drastically steer Shiv Sena away from Hindutva and towards the ‘secular’, minority-appeasing camp led by the Congress. The final change may not have taken place immediately in the public psyche, but the implications of this betrayal are finally catching up with Uddhav.
Third, Hindu consolidation has worked at the very grassroots levels in Maharashtra, mainly due to meticulous efforts put in by the RSS cadre. After almost three decades, there was a consolidation of Maratha and OBC votes in favour of the Mahayuti, defying all attempts by quota activists to create a divide between them. This was also facilitated by RSS’s groundwork to mobilize the Hindus. For the RSS, Maharashtra has an additional symbolic importance with the organization headquartered at Nagpur. Accordingly, RSS made efforts to mobilize voters especially in urban areas – which are usually afflicted by factors like voter apathy – like Nagpur, Pune and Mumbai, ensuring a high voter turnout in favour of the BJP, and reaching out to not only traditional BJP voters, but also fence-sitters. It conducted its gatherings through informal and apolitical communication aimed at uniting the people along cultural and religious lines, without explicitly doing propaganda for the BJP.
The RSS’s active support to the BJP in these elections is in contrast with its lack of support during the Lok Sabha elections, where it did not support BJP’s opportunistic alliance with the Ajit Pawar-led NCP and even blamed the latter for the Lok Sabha loss. In these elections, RSS has come to terms with the alliance provided that Devendra Fadnavis should lead the government in the event of Mahayuti’s win.
Finally, the RSS’s and the Sangh Parivar’s Hindutva mobilization that worked in Maharashtra appears to have yielded the opposite results in Jharkhand. The Jharkhand results show that despite Hindutva outreach among tribals over the last few decades, the rot of demographic change could not be averted. While in the initial years, Christian missionary conversions posed a major challenge to preserving tribal identity, in recent times, the rapid growth of Muslim population has magnified the challenge even further. Hindu-Muslim clashes, communal disturbances during Hindu festivals, and attacks on Hindus in certain areas have become increasingly frequent in recent times in the state, with the situation beginning to resemble the political realities in West Bengal under the Mamata Bannerjee government.
While in these elections, BJP has been able to retain and increase its vote share in Jharkhand, this is merely a temporary phenomenon in the face of the tide of demographic changes. Even in urban areas, BJP was undercut by the Congress, while JMM made a sweep in rural and tribal areas. Going forward, this new structural reality must be kept in mind by the BJP in Jharkhand, with the state increasingly going out of its grasp.
Conclusion
If there is one significant aspect that both the elections have brought out, it is that while nationalist cultural mobilization is indispensable, it is not enough to bring about lasting change if it is merely used in an expedient manner. Having learnt the right lessons from their Lok Sabha setback, the BJP is not now shying away from deploying clear and blunt Hindutva rhetoric – and its effectiveness has been seen in Maharashtra. But as Jharkhand results show, there is an urgent need to take the Hindutva and nationalism communication beyond mere rhetoric and slogans, and act on it.
The tendency of the BJP to mobilize Hindus just when elections are round the corner will not work to create lasting and effective change in face of the serious challenges being faced by a rapidly rising brand of fundamentalist Islam across the country. The latter is creating structural changes likely through population increase and probable strategic settlements – a trend that has even been witnessed in hill states like Uttarakhand. National and cultural mobilization needs to actively proceed regardless of electoral cycles, lest the country witnesses the transformation of more states into the West Bengal model.
Bibliography
Ranjan, M. (2024, September 13). The New Indian Express. Retrieved from https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Sep/12/tribal-population-in-santhal-pargana-declined-by-16-per-cent-centre-tells-jharkhand-hc#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIn%20the%202011%20census%2C%20the,and%20Christians%204.21%20per%20cent.
TOI. (2024). ‘Muslim Population Spike in Jharkhand is Simple Mathematics’. New Delhi: Times of India .
- Vote shares of key MVA parties: INC (12.4%); CPI-M (0.3%); SS-UBT (10%); NCP-SP (11.3%). ↑
- Vote shares of key Mahayuti parties: BJP (26.8%); SHS (12.4%); NCP (9%). ↑
- Party-wise seat share and vote share of key members: JMM: 34 (23.4%); INC: 16 (15.6%); RJD: 4 (3.4%). ↑
- Party-wise seat share and vote share of key members: BJP: 21 (33.2%); AJSUP: 1 (3.5%); JD-U: 1 (0.8%); LJP-RV: 1 (0.6%). ↑
- Here also BJP won the highest number of seats at 18, while Shiv Sena and NCP won 13 and 9 seats respectively. BJP even won Marathawada seats like Hingoli and Partur which have had sympathy for Uddhav Thackrey. ↑
- Out of the 5 seats won by MVA in the region, Congress secured just 1 seat (Latur), while SS-UBT won 3 seats and NCP-SP won 1 seat (Beed). ↑
