Highlights of February 2026

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Technology: India AI Summit

At a time when the world is moving precariously close to an apocalyptic unravelling of the collective material and psychological infrastructure that sustains it, India’s messaging at the fourth global summit on Artificial Intelligence (AI) held in New Delhi could not have been more erroneous or misplaced. For, after all, the apocalyptic future that the planet is moving towards has technology for its driving fuel, our environment for its field of exploitation and use, and humans as delusional egoistic puppets. All three reinforce each other, but the increasing reliance on technology has now become a determining factor in shaping our terrestrial lives. For, it is technological extractivism that drives planetary ecological degradation, even as humans continue to think that the solution to the planetary crisis lies in more technology. This, in turn, has made us not only psychologically handicapped puppets but also psychologically hollow.

And as far as psychological depravity and planetary destruction are concerned, the new face of the emergent wave of technology is Artificial Intelligence (AI). And because it is not an exclusive innovation, but one that is readily and cheaply available to everyone, its rise has led to ascendant debates about its adaptability, safety and regulation. After all, combined with the heady cocktail of social media and gaming in the digital world, it has succeeded in impairing the cognitive abilities of an entire generation of young people. Its integration with economic systems is creating new vulnerabilities, while its inevitable integration with military systems is bringing the world closer to a destructive precipice.

And yet, the world of AI, as portrayed through the successive global AI summits in the UK, South Korea and France, and now India, shows a near total disregard of these possibilities. While the first three global AI summits,[1] all held in developed countries, attempted to deal with safety and regulatory aspects of AI as well as its development and innovation, the fourth summit, held in India recently, has chartered a new, entirely narrow path altogether. It neither makes safety nor innovation its focal concern, and instead, subsumes both within the oft-parroted lexicon of ‘development’, which, in turn, it places within the politicized framework of geopolitical divides. This is made evident through the Delhi Declaration adopted at the summit, as well as through the themes which were the dominant focal areas of discussion during the summit.

These themes included the following main focal areas:

First, the language of the declaration was oriented towards the typical lexicon of development. It speaks of the ‘promise’ of AI in the happiness and welfare of all and then goes on to clarify the seven ‘chakras’ or pillars of AI development. These include – development of human capital, social empowerment, trustworthiness of AI systems, energy efficiency of AI systems, use of AI in science, democratizing AI, and use of AI for economic growth and social good. Such glowing language not only reveals a commendation and endorsement of AI but also betrays India’s unwillingness to grasp the consequences of the role of AI in accelerating collective destruction. Not only this, but it also shows how India conceives of AI in extremely narrow terms – as a developmental opportunity to be exploited for commercial use rather than as a disruptive innovation that may shape the next frontiers of colonization, both material and psychological. It is no wonder that major discussions at the summit focused on the role of AI in leading to growth, how it will affect all economic sectors and its impact on the job market.

Second, India’s discourse, as visible through the summit and the Declaration, is based on a major assumption – that by constricting and limiting AI within the bureaucratic walls of intellectual idealism where we paint AI as a ‘global commons’, we can democratize the use of AI. Predictably, this was the purpose of the repeated emphasis on Global South placed at the summit. What India does not realize is that the next technological Cold War of innovation has already polarized the world between USA and China on the one hand, and between capitalism and statism on the other, with technology in the driving seat. India must acknowledge that even existent global commons, such as the high seas, outer space etc., are subject to geopolitical headwinds. It is the language of power that speaks more. But in case of AI, where both commercial and military applications are at stake, this is even more so. Not only is technology sharing difficult to envisage in such a context but is even dangerous to wish for. For, the more India increases exposure to foreign AI models, the more it will be putting its national security and data privacy at risk. Under such conditions of polarization, any talk of democratizing AI merely implies the trickling down of end-use technological applications from the powers which decide their formulation and deployment.

Third, in this context, India’s deliberate framing of the ‘Global South’ – seen over the last few years across other forums as well, such as G20 and climate change talks – becomes deeply problematic. Democratizing AI and making it accessible to the Global South further reinforces the idea of the Global South as a perennially deprived geography that must always remain a recipient and consumer of technologies whose formulation and use is directed by the developed countries, particularly the West.

There is a fundamental issue with this ‘Global South’ framing. It seeks to transpose the ‘North versus South’ or ‘developed countries versus developing countries’ binary onto the growing AI discourse, in a bid to foster AI multilateralism and create a negotiation regime around it. If India does succeed in replicating this binary within a future AI regime, then it will likely result in a repetition of the deadlock witnessed in most other international regimes, with developed countries initially weaponizing AI and achieving monopolistic capabilities and later emphasizing on safety, while developing countries, too handicapped to innovate or get a first mover’s advantage, will later end up demanding proliferation of AI technologies in the name of equity and distributive justice so that they can replicate the path followed by the developed countries.

At the end, this would be a self-defeating proposition, as the binary between developed countries and developing countries deceptively shows differences where there are none. Both set of binaries do not significantly differ in their fundamental worldview on maximizing the selfish application of AI. In fact, what this binary between ‘North versus South’ does achieve is to mask the reality that the dangers of AI development will hardly respect borders and will pose an existential threat to the whole of humanity. Whether it is the set of countries which weaponizes AI or the set of countries that demands access to it, once this technology reaches a stage of autonomy where it will be beyond human control, the impact will be devastating for all countries. Therefore, erecting petty political binaries in the hopes of gaining leverage does not help in facing a common threat confronting humanity. We risk repeating the same blunders committed in dealing with climate change.

Fourth, all this talk of democratizing AI and leveraging its uses for developmental purposes – which has disappointingly infused the Indian rhetoric – is based on the dangerous assumption that AI is worth democratizing and can be equitably distributed like a global common. Already governments around the world are moving to curtail social media and internet usage by young teenagers due to its destructive impact. So, when India talks about democratization, it will entail easy accessibility to various AI applications, and further increase dependency. What makes this assumption of democratization even worse is that it is based on facilitating access to foreign-made AI applications, thereby increasing foreign dependency, and effectively making India a consumer nation. And yet, in what can best be described as a completely unhinged approach, the Delhi Declaration, in a striking resonance with US policy which champions ‘more and not less AI’, calls for widespread adoption of AI by the developing countries subject to only minimalistic voluntary, non-binding safeguards.

Finally, India must realize that its mushrooming discourse around AI is not only entailing foreign dependence and consumerism but also wholesale psychological slavery. Just like countries weaponize drugs at a systematic, cross-border level to sow security challenges within the territories of their adversaries, AI can be weaponized at a much larger scale to sow addiction, destroy the youth and create psychological hollowness, in individual character and collective social systems, over a prolonged period. This will result in a far deeper loss of national character and energy than the physical destruction caused by wars or economic upheavals.

Modi’s Israel Visit

At a time when the US-Iran tensions were reaching their peak due to the standoff in diplomatic negotiations, Modi’s visit to Israel stood out as amongst the most significant political events which will have wide resonance in the years to come. Within barely two days of Modi’s visit, US and Israel launched a joint attack on Iran. The expectation of such an attack had become quite credible as the negotiations stalemated over irreconcilable issues, and yet, Modi’s deliberate decision to visit at such a precarious time is in itself a message. This was a message of India’s unwavering support for Israel, as highlighted through Modi’s speech in the Knesset where he emphasized that India always stands with Israel in the present moment and in the future.

This is not only significant for Israel which has not had a core ally apart from the USA and Germany, but also for India, as this visit signals a drastic reorientation of India’s foreign policy. From Non-Alignment during the Cold War to Strategic Autonomy after the Cold War to Multi-alignment in the present scenario, India’s foreign policy has taken the first step towards picking a decisive side.

Given the present world conditions – where the incidence of wars and conflicts have increased to such an extent that one misplaced enforcement of any alliance in any conflict would likely precipitate in a Third World War – India has chosen its sides at an opportune moment. The forces of power in the world are no longer arranged in a way which offers any middle ground. Any illusion of middle ground can only be a temporary hedging bet. India first reluctantly accepted this reality few years after the Russia-Ukraine war. Despite its efforts to insulate itself and maintain status quo, India soon realized that no amount of political or moral or historical or economic justification could mask the reality that partnership with Russia had become a liability to India’s national interest. Thus, India sought to undo the decades-old Russian partnership, weaning itself away from Russian military procurement and merely retaining oil purchases. Trump’s tariffs finished off the latter as well. India’s changed orientation was first made visible during Putin’s recent visit which saw no new defence contracts being signed. In contrast, India struck prominent strategic and defence partnerships with traditional American allies like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the European Union (EU).

The Prime Minister’s visit to Israel comes on the back of this significant diversification and deepening of alliances in a manner which is on track to place India firmly within the Western-oriented countries. But unlike its strategic partnerships with its other partners, the deepening of India’s relationship with Israel holds much more significance, as it sets India on the path of unprecedented defence fortification, security expansion and technological advancement. At the same time, and more importantly, due to the strong anti-Islamic ideological and cultural parity between the two countries, the psychological bond that cements this partnership is something that would continue to remain the exclusive preserve of India-Israel relations. Modi’s visit is indicative of how this bond will play out in years to come, with the following immediate possibilities visible:

First, Modi’s visit was meant to further cement this ideological-psychological element, as visible through Israeli premier, Benjamin Netanyahu’s advocacy of the security concept of a ‘hexagonal alliance’, with India and Israel as its central pillars, and spanning other countries such as Greece, Cyprus, and some Arab and African countries. The stated aim of this alliance would be to counter what Netanyahu called the ‘radical axes, both the radical Shia axis…and the emerging radical Sunni axis.’ The envisaged hexagonal alliance, meant to counter Islamic radicalism, was a direct response to the attempts by Sunni states to form what many fear as an ‘Islamic NATO’, with attempts by key Sunni countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to band together under the new possibilities opened up by the Saudi-Pakistan Mutual Defence Pact, which would guarantee the Sunni countries the protection of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. This attempt to shape a new balance of power by the Sunni countries in the Middle East has been viewed by Israel as a direct attempt to counter its dominance made possible by the Israeli decimation of Shia power, through the degradation suffered by Shia states such as Iran and Syria as well as Iranian proxy militias such as Hezbollah, Houthis and Hamas. With the decline of Iran enabling the Sunni states to make some attempt to counter Israel, new lines for future conflict are being drawn across the region. This also brings Pakistan directly in Israel’s crosshairs. It will also require the formation of a counter-alliance in which India is expected to play a key part.

Second, Modi’s visit, reinforces the psychological deterrent back in the South Asian region as well. The decimation of Iran, – with the looming possibility of regime change – the hostility with Afghanistan, the deepening of defence and security dimensions of India-Israel partnership and the fruition of hexagonal alliance in the future are events that threaten to encircle Pakistan in ways that pose a direct threat to it and against which even the Saudi-Pakistan Defence Pact will not be of much utility.

Pakistan also realizes that Israel has always had an interest in dismantling or weakening Pakistan’s nuclear programme, as it is the only Islamic country with nuclear capabilities. Even as far back as the 1980s, Israel had requested India’s assistance in bombing Pakistan’s nuclear facilities but could not do so due to India’s refusal. Today, the situation is vastly different, with an India that is explicitly pro-Israel and quite aware of the duplicitous nature of Islamic appeasement under the garb of secularism. On past occasions, Pakistan has acknowledged that its weapons suffered damage from Israeli interceptors and missiles used during Operation Sindoor. With a full-fledged strategic and defence partnership between India and Israel, and with India weaning itself away from Russia, to fully integrate with Israel,[2] the psychological costs of aggression and the psychological necessity of deterrence have gone up considerably for Pakistan.

Third, Modi’s Israel visit was not only rooted in the temporary instrumentality of politics, but as evident through Modi’s speech in the Knesset, it has sought to expand India-Israel ties on a civilizational basis. Modi openly acknowledged India and Israel as two ancient civilizations whose contact with each other go beyond the modern era. This indicates the attempt to build deeper, ideological ties which go beyond politics and are rooted in a shared cultural outlook. Such an orientation is not surprising, as strengthening relationship with Israel has always been a core part of the BJP’s manifesto ever since the party was formed. In the past, it was under BJP’s leadership that India-Israel visits at the highest levels were facilitated and ties expanded.

Under the present conditions, attributing a civilizational basis to the relationship imparts a kind of character and morality which is rapidly disappearing from most other bilateral and multilateral relationships. India’s other relationships, such as the ones with the EU, the US, the UAE and other key partners, are more utilitarian than substantive. They suffer from a lack of cultural depth, ideological incompatibility, moral minimalism and trust deficit. With Israel, it is these psychological imperatives that ground the foundational basis of the relationship. Everything else follows on the basis of these foundations. Even when, in the past, India did not openly cultivate the relationship with Israel, the latter always stood with India. Such a level of trust and reliability is what imparts moral character, and leads to psychological strengthening, both internally and externally.

Finally, it is not only the external but also the internal dimensions that stand to benefit from the growing India-Israel ties. Already, since the last few years, India has been replicating Israel’s security model within its own territory, especially in disturbed areas like Kashmir, and also to maintain law and order and control across the territory. These have been effective in improving the security situation in the country. At the same time, deeper cultural integration can also lead to changes in the collective psychology. Till now, India has been cultivated through western modes of thinking, which tend to favour selfishness, survival and comfort rather than courage and national pride. The more India is able to delink from this mould and expose itself to new influences, such as Israeli and Asian, the more will it help fill the psychological vacuum created by our entrenched hollowness.

Bangladesh’s Elections

Coming nearly two years after violent youth-led protests toppled the Sheikh Hasina government in 2024, the Bangladesh elections have been awaited with much anticipation. At stake in these elections were the geopolitical calculus of India, Pakistan, China and the United States, as well as the uncertainty and anxiety of religious minorities, particularly Hindus, living within Bangladesh. With the election results handing a comfortable two-thirds majority to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by late Khaleda Zia’s son Tarique Rehman, this uncertainty has now been resolved to a great extent.

Party Seats won
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 209
Jamaat-e-Islami party (JIB) 68
National Citizen Party (NCP) 6
Others 14

 

The absence of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League (AL) from these elections due to the ban imposed on the party had a substantive influence over the electoral process, while the elimination of Hasina from Bangladesh’s politics in the times to come will have major internal and external consequences. The immediate consequences are as follows:

First, the inter- and intra-party dynamic – The absence of AL has gone a long way in changing and re-shaping the BNP – for the better. In this election, BNP has displayed nuanced positions and has moved away from Islamic fundamentalism to instead advocating minority rights, democracy, law and order, welfarism and secularism. When Hasina was active and electoral contests took place directly between the BNP and the AL, it was the latter which used to champion democracy, welfarism and secularism, while the BNP was pushed to champion Islamic values – and, on one occasion, even formally ally with the Jamaat – to counter the AL. With the AL gone, BNP has no such compulsion. In fact, it is the opposite, as BNP now seeks to cultivate a broad voter base by appealing to former AL voters. Further, with the BNP now in a direct contest with Jamaat, it seeks to actively counter Islamic fundamentalism and preserve democracy and law and order. That the BNP succeeded in changing the political dynamic along this new logic was reflected in the clean sweep of two-thirds majority it achieved.

Second, the larger socio-cultural dynamic – The victory of BNP has also stabilized the rapidly deteriorating social and security situation within Bangladesh witnessed under the previous caretaker government of Mohammad Yunus. Under Yunus, there was a widespread jungle raj of sorts, with radical Islamist terrorists released from jail and given a free hand. A prolonged massacre – indeed almost a genocide – of minorities, especially Hindus, was taking place. Law and order, in general, was in decline. Universities became dens of Islamist ideology, going to the extent of imposing the burkha on women students. Welfare outreach had completely disappeared.

The situation was so bad that interim surveys revealed that Hasina was the most popular leader among people, despite the revolt against her. It was only after BNP became more critical of Yunus and began to change its orientation that an alternative could emerge. With the BNP coming to power, the existing state of social and cultural disarray is expected to give way to a centrist status quo. In the run-up to the elections, BNP has showcased its record in minority protection. However, in the seats where Jamaat has won – mostly areas bordering India – security situation is expected to continue remaining fragile.

Third, the changed internal political dynamic – Amongst the most significant aspects of the present elections has been the structural political adjustments that it will bring in its wake, especially in terms of the implementation of the ‘July Charter.’ For, along with the votes cast for the general elections, the voters also simultaneously voted on the ‘July Charter’ – a set of more than 80 constitutional changes that, if implemented, will set Bangladesh on a path towards greater democracy and structural accountability. With more than 65% of the electorate voting in favour of the ‘July Charter’, the popular demand for political reform has now been conveyed to the new government.

Key Highlights of the July Charter referendum:

A two-term limit on office of PM.
PM can no longer simultaneously serve as head of government and head of party.
PM can declare a state of emergency only with written consent of the cabinet and the leader of opposition.
Establishment of two houses in the Parliament.
Deputy Speaker in the Parliament must be from the main opposition party.
Reserved seats for women in the lower house will increase to 100 seats.
Restoration of caretaker government to oversee every general election.
Changing the official identity of the Republic from ‘Bengali’ to ‘Bangladeshi.’
Formation of an independent judicial appointments commission to prevent executive interference in judicial appointments.
New fundamental rights added – right to uninterrupted internet and right to personal data privacy.
Indemnity for everyone who participated in the July-August 2024 anti-Hasina uprising.

 

Once confirmed, the new Parliament will function as a Constitutional Reform and will have to confirm the reforms within 180 days. While the BNP has signaled its willingness to implement the Charter, it has also come up with elaborate amendments to several existing provisions.

Finally, the changed regional dynamics – Under the former caretaker government of Yunus, run by Islamic fundamentalists, the regional dynamies had become heavily skewed in favour of Pakistan. Bangladesh had opened up cooperation channels with Pakistan – in military and civilian domains – which had never been done since its formation in 1971. Bangladesh also cultivated relations with China, with the latter even hosting a trilateral between Beijing, Dhaka and Islamabad. Defence cooperation and investments saw some of the biggest breakthroughs.

Being an important Indo-Pacific country, Bangladesh has always had major strategic importance for India, in terms of connectivity, power projection in the Indo-Pacific, as a buffer in containing Pakistan and China and in curtailing illegal flow of drugs and immigrants and thereby helping to maintain India’s internal security and integrity of its borders. The period of the Yunus regime saw a progressive dismantling of this security architecture. The return of BNP, with its changed orientation, is likely to restore some balance to the relationship with India. Even prior to the elections, the BNP had signalled its intention to maintain better relations with India, and India had then reciprocated. Rehman’s victory saw Modi becoming one of the initial world leaders to congratulate him but accompanied by the caveat that India expected the new government to be ‘inclusive.’ This was a reference to the record of Hindu killings that had taken place under Yunus.

  1. The first two summits in the UK and South Korea focused on safety and managing the risks of AI, while the France summit marginalized safety concerns in favour of boosting AI innovation.
  2. India is now Israel’s biggest arms importer, buying defence goods worth billions of dollars from Israel every year and directly benefitting the Israeli defence industry. Moreover, as later investigations reveal, in 2024, India supplied rockets and explosives to aid Israel’s war in Gaza in 2024.
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