Developments in Russia-Ukraine War: The Alaska Summit and Escalations
The Russia-Ukraine war has taken on a new turn. This new course has become apparent after the failure of ill-willed diplomatic routes attempted under the leadership of US President, Donald Trump. One major diplomatic manoeuvre of this kind was the much-anticipated Alaska summit between Trump and Putin, which took place in August. As expected, the summit did not yield any substantive outcomes. However, it did have an impact in tempering expectations and setting the course for the immediate future.
A Convoluted Backdrop
The question of intentions becomes the most relevant to explain the backdrop of the Alaska summit. The way the summit was planned and orchestrated revealed the exact contours of Trump’s approach towards the war. Prior to the summit, Trump imposed sweeping 50% tariffs on Indian imports to the United States, ostensibly to show that these tariffs will halt ‘Russia’s war machine.’ Ironically, no direct action was taken against Russia itself or against countries from where Russia is getting major share of its military and economic supplies. This not only tanked US’s relations with India – which had already nosedived after the India-Pakistan conflict – but also revealed Trump’s weakness, as the twelve-day deadline given to Russia by Trump, at the end of July, to stop the war was blatantly disregarded by the former. Russia’s blatant insult to Trump was instead rewarded by an invitation to a summit with Trump.
The summit not only gave legitimacy to Putin – who is an international pariah with an arrest warrant against him by the International Criminal Court – but also betrayed Trump’s desperation to simply arrive at a deal to end the war, primarily so that he could claim credit for doing so. In Trump’s calculus, the concern was not with the terms on which the war would be ended or to ensure such terms which would prevent Russia from undertaking such aggression in the future. Rather, the primary motive was blatant self-glorification. This is in line with Trump’s past boasts – upon assuming the Presidency earlier this year – that only his meeting with Putin can finally end the war. This is likely one of the reasons that Ukraine and other key European countries were excluded from the talks which sought to decide Ukraine and Europe’s future.
An Outcome with No Takeaway
With such a convoluted backdrop, it is no surprise that the talks ended without any agreement. During the talks, while Trump did not offer any firm vision or position on ending the war, vaguely mentioning security guarantees for Ukraine, Putin put forward clear demands. These included Russia’s insistence on sticking to the 2022 blueprint evolved at the Istanbul talks after the start of the war, as well as Russia’s insistence on addressing the ‘root’ causes of the war. Thus, Putin was clear that Russia wanted Ukraine to swap Donbas region, give up the demand to joint North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), grant Russian an official language status and take steps towards neutrality, which may include demilitarization. These demands would reduce Ukraine not to a status of neutrality but to the status of an effective Russian puppet, much like Belarus.
These demands by Russia were in clear contrast to Trump’s self-centred position, which only focused on ending the war regardless of the terms. Even after the summit, Trump attempted to show the utter failure of the summit in a positive light by insisting that Putin had agreed to ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine and that soon Russia, Ukraine and the USA could have a trilateral meeting. He even attempted to convince Ukraine to agree to some of Russia’s terms, such as land swapping.
A Clear Pathway for the Immediate Future
While the summit was followed by a meeting of Trump with Zelensky and other key European leaders in Washington, the meeting expectedly did not yield much. Instead, the aftermath of the Alaska summit has made it clear that the war is here to stay and that any kind of peace deal under the present circumstances would not materialize. While Russia wanted a peace deal and a face-saving exit few months back, in recent times, the suicidal upheaval unleashed by Trump on the western world has emboldened Putin to continue the war with renewed vigour, as reflected in massive Russian attacks on Ukraine even as the talks with Trump were going on. Trump’s arrival has also strengthened Russia-China partnership much more than before, with China signalling that it does not want to see Russia lose in the war.
Thus, Ukraine has no options but to continue fighting. Any peace deal under present conditions might be more detrimental rather than useful for Ukraine. In the wake of the Alaska summit, this reality appears to have been accepted by both Ukraine and other European countries, reflected in Europe’s massive push towards rearmament, redeveloping of the defence industrial base and acceleration in military spending. European countries have also pledged firm commitments of weapons and technology to Ukraine. Thus, the failure of the Alaska summit has served to clarify the future course more than ever before.
Changing Geopolitics: Trump Tariff Turmoil and the SCO Summit
The recently held summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) marks a significant shift from a security to a political architecture of the SCO. Conceived as a narrow security organization meant to cater to Chinese interests in Central Asia, SCO has now developed into a full-fledged club of anti-West countries. Nowhere was this most visible than in the recently held SCO summit hosted by China at Tianjin.
The India Factor:
A key reason for the prominence accorded to the recent SCO summit was that it was successful in integrating India into its consensual fold – a significant development, considering that India has always been an outlier and a balancing force between the East and the West, and the only full-fledged democracy in an otherwise autocratic group. This integration of India was accompanied by:
First, the resumption of economic and political exchanges between India and China played an important role. The process had already started since the Kazan meeting between PM Modi and Chinese Premier Xi Jinping in 2024. The meeting led to a resumption of dialogue as well as comprehensive disengagement in Ladakh, although de-escalation has not been fully achieved.
Second, the changing geopolitical environment underwent further sharp polarization since Trump assumed the US Presidency. Initial American attempts to fight a trade war with China – by imposing semiconductor export controls and extremely high tariffs on Chinese goods – fell flat not only because China refused to give in, but also because China’s decision to impose export controls over the supply of rare earth metals, over which China enjoys near monopoly. Since these critical metals are crucial to the various supply chains affecting automobile and other sectors, this came as a shock to the West. The Indian automobile industry also suffered a shock, as Chinese export controls were applied uniformly for everyone. India had, thus, already been in talks with China.
Third, the 50% tariffs imposed by Trump on Indian goods, accompanied by his administration’s daily diatribe against India as well as courting of Pakistan, went a long way in drastically changing the Indian outlook. Not only did this significantly rupture the Indo-US relations in immediate terms but has also ruptured the trust and predictability on which long-terms relations could stand. Thanks to the Indo-Pak conflict, followed soon by Trump’s actions and diatribe, the insecurity precipitated in India has led the country to aggressively pursue military build-up – to the extent of leading Pakistan to say that India’s sudden military acquisitions and production are threatening regional peace and security – and seek to fortify economically. Trump has, thus, single-handedly acted as a wake-up call for an Indian regime that was otherwise slipping into gross ennui. This has acted as a major factor in turning India towards China.
Finally, China and Russia were quick to capitalize on India’s souring relations with the US. This was visible in China’s quick decision to remove rare earth export controls for India as well as in the success of bilateral meeting held between Modi and Xi on the SCO sidelines, preceded by the comprehensive groundwork laid by Chinese foreign minister’s visit to India.
All this groundwork contributed to such optics from the SCO summit as to have jolted the western world. What was noticeable was the bonhomie between Xi, Putin and Modi which made headlines across the western media, and the visible marginalization of Pakistan, despite the presence of Asim Munir, whom Trump had personally hosted. That Pakistan would sign the final SCO declaration despite its references to cross-border terrorism and condemning Pahalgam attack, was also a first.
This led to a great deal of debates within American political circles, with Democrats blaming the Trump administration of laying waste to decades of hard work in building a comprehensive partnership with India, at a time when the US sees China as its main competitor. This was also accompanied by the Democrats’ allegations and American media reports that Trump had cozied up to Pakistan for personal commercial gains, including lying about mediating between India and Pakistan. The aftermath of SCO summit appears to have similarly jolted the Trump administration, which had likely expected India – as an ally – to indulge the US, like Europe, Japan, South Korea and even Pakistan have been doing. This jolt was visible in the post-SCO comments and positions by Trump administration in which a much softer position towards India is evident. Thus, the SCO summit was merely a prelude to the West’s worst insecurities about letting India slip away into the Chinese orbit.
China’s Military Parade:
The military parade by China was yet another massive jolt for the western world and sought to convey a larger message about China’s changing role. On display was not only the most sophisticated arsenal of the Chinese military, but also the bonhomie between Xi, Putin and North Korea’s Kim. The parade was also attended by leaders of other Asian countries (except India), spanning south and south-east Asia. The display was meant to convey that China was now militarily proportionate to the United States, and that geopolitical alignments had considerably hardened. It was akin to laying down the battlelines for the future. In this rapidly polarizing world with no middle ground, India is one of the few countries which are not a part of any formal alliance. While India will be unavoidably forced to change positions in a rapidly narrowing scenario, it must continue to engage all sides.
Parliament Session:
What initially appeared to be a Parliamentary session that might largely be a washout resulted in the passage of several key legislations towards the end of the session. The initial weeks of the session were dominated by political theatrics over Operation Sindoor, issues like manipulation of elections as well as Opposition’s attempt to question the working of the Election Commission. However, despite massive rallies and yatras by Rahul Gandhi, these issues did not only not resonate with the public but also failed to move various other sections of the Opposition itself. Despite all this political acrimony, several important legislations could be debated and passed by the Parliament. Around 15 Acts were passed in this session of the Parliament. Some key Acts include the following:
Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025:
The Act mainly aims to regulate the fast-developing market of online gaming, in particular online games involving the exchange of money. The Act classifies games into e-sports, educational/social games, and online money games. While e-sports and non-monetary games are permitted, online money games involving betting or wagering are strictly banned. This includes popular games like rummy, poker, fantasy sports etc. which have been a significant source of revenue in India’s online gaming industry.
Some of the key provisions of the Act include:
- The Act prohibits all online money games, regardless of whether they are games of skill or chance.
- The Act establishes a Central Online Gaming Authority to oversee compliance with the Act.
- Penalties for violations include:
- Offering online money games is punishable by imprisonment for up to three years, a fine of up to one crore rupees, or both.
- Advertising online money games is punishable by imprisonment for up to two years, a fine of up to 50 lakh rupees, or both.
- Institutions that process transactions for banned games can face imprisonment for up to three years, a fine of up to one crore rupees, or both.
- Search and seizure power of law enforcement authorities have been increased to enable them to conduct operations in both physical and digital spaces.
The Act represents a significant attempt to address multiple challenges stemming out of the world of online gaming. It draws from much more stringent Chinese regulatory framework where the government regulates gaming and even the number of hours children spend on screen. The Indian Act seeks to address one aspect of this addiction to online gaming by banning the monetary incentives that lead most teenagers and adults to play such games. Rising trend of addiction to gaming, leading to suicide and financial ruin has been a cause of concern. As access to Internet becomes cheaper and easier, this addiction may have spread to India’s remote areas as well, with rising prevalence of Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) especially among college and school students. The multi-billion-dollar gaming industry in India will suffer significantly because of this Act, and this Act will also create a dent in government revenue from the industry. It is now being contested before the Supreme Court, with pro-industry petitions arguing that the Act is in conflict with the basic Fundamental Rights to do business freely, as well as with right to life and personal liberty.
It is unlikely that these petitions will be successful. The Act represents a much needed and overdue step to prevent the future of the country from falling into a complete psychological ruin.
Ports Act, 2025:
The Ports Act, 2025 repeals the archaic Indian Ports Act, 1908, and introduces a modern regulatory framework to govern port operations, infrastructure, and services. With the rise of maritime geopolitical competition, this is a much needed and long overdue reform to advance the goals of national security in the maritime domain. The Act seeks to modernize the country’s maritime sector, by streamlining port governance, promoting integrated port-led development, and aligning India’s maritime regulations with global standards.
Its key provisions include:
- Establishment of Maritime State Development Council (MSDC) to create better governance coordination between centre and states in port governance.
- Establishment of State Maritime Boards (SMBs) in coastal states to manage non-major ports within their jurisdiction.
- Mandatory alignment with international environmental standards, including conventions such as International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the Ballast Water Management Convention. As a result of such compliance, ports will have to regularly prepare and audit pollution control and disaster management plans.
- Creation of state-specific Dispute Resolution Committees (DRCs) to settle disputes related to functioning and operation of ports.
Given the rising importance of the maritime domain to geopolitics, this Act represents India’s attempt to align port development with more efficient global standards, as well as to address the rising impacts of climate change on the blue economy.
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2025:
This was another very important Act passed in the recent Parliament session. It seeks to reform mineral governance and promote critical mineral development in the country. The Act amends the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, to focus on minerals that are vital for India’s economic and green energy transition.
Its key provisions include:
- In order to secure a domestic supply of minerals essential for electric vehicles (EVs) and renewable energy, the Act enables leaseholders to add strategic and critical minerals, such as lithium, graphite, nickel, cobalt, gold, and silver, to existing leases without paying additional royalties.
- Establishes an authority to register and regulate mineral exchanges, for the purpose of increasing investment and transparency.
- The scope of the National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) has been expanded to fund the development of mines and minerals, both within and outside India.
- The previous limit of 50% on the sale of minerals by captive mines (which extract minerals primarily for their own use) has been removed. Captive mines can now sell all surplus production after meeting their own end-use requirements.
- Promotes easy facilitation of deep-sea mining, by allowing a one-time extension of the leased area.
At a time of rising geopolitical conflict, underpinned by the race to acquire critical minerals, this Act represents a long overdue step by the government. Critical minerals form the basis of the modern economic transition towards sophisticated defence technology, transport and communications and the green transition. These are used in everything from the most basic components of cars and laptops to more sophisticated defence equipment. Recent geopolitical conflicts have resulted in a global trade war over these minerals, with China monopolizing the domain of their processing and development. With China imposing export controls over these minerals, USA has been taking aggressive steps to secure itself. These include a plethora of mercantile agreements signed with countries like Ukraine, Pakistan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in return for US security partnerships, as well as acquiring domestic companies which specialize in the production of these minerals.
India itself was jolted by China’s universal export controls, as these dealt a major setback to India’s plans for an EV transition. While China has now removed export controls for India, the present Act represents India’s awareness that it needs to vigorously develop its own development capabilities in this sector to reduce import dependency and shield itself from increasing global headwinds.
While many other Acts were passed and Bills introduced during this session, these represented the key pieces of legislation, which, if implemented well, can have immediate impact on India’s security interests. Another significant Bill which was introduced but could not be passed and was referred to a Parliamentary Joint Committee was the Constitution (One hundred and thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025. This legislation seeks to bring about more transparency in politics by allowing for the automatic removal from office of high public functionaries (such as, Prime Minister, Chief Ministers and Cabinet Ministers) who have been arrested and detained for 30 consecutive days for an offence punishable with five years or more of imprisonment. The Bill allows for the reinstatement of these officials once the functionary has been released from custody.
Predictably, the Bill generated the most controversy among the Opposition parties. It was seen as an attempt by the government to target Opposition leaders and Chief Ministers in the name of corruption, and to misuse investigative agencies for corruption investigations. However, the fact that the Bill allows for a reinstatement of the removed minister shows that the intent of the Bill is to name and shame rather than permanently incarcerate. In a democratic setup like India where chances of corruption are much higher, the Bill appears to have borrowed from the Chinese setup where President Xi has become known for conducting regular raids on corrupt leaders and officials resulting in their removal from office. Even the Army has not been exempted from such periodic purges. This has helped Xi control in time the rapidly deteriorating Chinese political culture where a few dynastic ‘princelings’ had become entrenched in the system. It is unlikely that the Indian process will be as neat and well-defined – and probabilities of misuse will always remain – but the Bill, by combining stringent measures with less stringent ones, signals that it primarily aims to cultivate public trust. Such public trust has been sorely lacking, and corruption has become so pervasive in India that the public has come to naturally expect it from the leaders. The Bill cannot possibly bring about the deeper change that is required to deal with the moral rot in our public domain, but represents a commendable attempt to bring some outer uniformity and deal with the outer symptoms of this rot.
