Developments in Russia-Ukraine War
The Continued Failure of Diplomacy:
The third round of Russia-Ukraine negotiations in Turkey, held towards the end of July, have predictably not yielded any substantive outcome. The two sides only agreed to maintain further communication and continue the release of prisoners from both the sides. Ukraine’s request to initiate a direct meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy was rejected outright by Russia, despite Trump’s pressure.
One of the key reasons for the failure of these meetings is the widespread perception that Zelenskyy merely amplifies the stance of key European states, mainly Germany and the United Kingdom, which are firmly set on continuing the war, so speaking with him makes little sense. That is why Russia has repeatedly rejected a possible Putin-Zelenskyy summit. On the other hand, Russia believes that rather than Europe, it will be the stand the US takes which will be decisive to the outcome of the war. This makes Russia keen to have a direct summit between Trump and Putin, through which Russia believes it can secure a more favourable peace deal by representing itself from a position of strength.
Russia’s Projection of Strength:
This position of strength has been difficult to project, considering Russia’s steady economic downturn and strained resources due to the ongoing war. On the one hand, the Russian economy is facing the burden of a lack of investment and serious over taxation, thereby generating domestic suffering and discontent along with repression. On the other hand, the Russian regime has continued to allocate resources to further pump the country’s military-industrial complex which is crucial to sustaining its war against Ukraine. The regime has used both these outlets to project a part-illusion of strength.
In terms of the economy, Russia has continued to maintain that successive sanctions since the last three years has not damaged the Russian economy to the extent that was expected, and that Russia has been able to bypass these sanctions. Interestingly, the latest data now reveals that this was not only because China[1] and India continued to buy oil from Russia (with China being the biggest buyer of Russian oil), or because Iran and other countries of the Global South continue to engage in Russian partnerships (for example, consider Kazakhstan’s decision to award the tender for its nuclear power plant construction to Russia’s Rosatom instead of China, while awarding the tender for the next power plant to China), but also because the western countries have themselves continued to do business with Russia. Consider the fact that in 2024, approximately 35 percent of U.S. uranium imports (used for nuclear fuel) came from Russia. In 2024, US’s total trade with Russia was an estimated USD 5.2 billion.[2] Furthermore, in 2024, total trade in goods between the EU and Russia amounted to USD 78 billion.[3]
In terms of military, Russia has continued to upgrade its military industrial complex despite the strain it puts on its resources. This has particularly taken place in the direction of enhancing nuclear capabilities. The most recent indicator of this was the inauguration of the newly built strategic submarine Knyaz Pozharsky, the eighth of the Borei-class submarines. Despite the state budget’s difficulties, funding for the costly program of constructing two classes of nuclear submarines was provided without delays or cuts. Russia’s expansion of arsenal also includes what it calls the “wonder-weapons” such as the nuclear-propelled Poseidon underwater drone. Further, Russia’s overall geostrategic position continues to be bolstered by the fact that alongside China and Australia, it controls major production and export chains of several critical minerals. Alongside China, it leads in mineral processing infrastructure and capabilities. In 2022, Russia was the source of 40 percent of global uranium enrichment.
Ukraine’s Gains:
Even though Russia continues to upgrade its military complex and continues to derive legitimacy and material help from its partnership with powerful allies like China, Ukraine has displayed a steady upgradation of capabilities on the battlefield. Some time back, the sophisticated ‘Operation Spiderweb’ against Russia shed light on Ukrainian successes. More recently, Ukraine has also displayed capabilities in degrading Russia’s air power, including taking down Russian fighter jets and successfully targeting sophisticated Russian air defence systems. The Ukrainian Air Force’s effectiveness has opened the ability to increasingly conduct combat missions in both Crimea, as well as Russian border areas. This is being achieved by two primary means. First, a series of continuous strikes is being conducted on Russia’s air defence systems, including radars and missile launchers. The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR) regularly reports on the destruction of expensive and increasingly rare Russian systems. Second, the Ukrainian Air Force continues to compromise the Russian military’s production and supply lines with strikes on military and industrial facilities deep inside Russian territory.
Technology Update: China’s Dominance of Internet of Things (IoT)
China is presently close to perfecting the relationship between technology and politics by redefining the role of technology in everyday lives. China’s increasing dominance of the IoT landscape reveals how technological dominance can be used not only for expanding the consumerist economy based on utility and business, but also to project power and control in the events of war. This heralds a new era wherein power will be increasingly ‘implied in the structures’ of networks rather than just military might. This underpins China’s long-term strategy to become the world’s leading manufacturer of the cyber-physical systems that increasingly underpin modern life. These systems blur the line between the digital and physical worlds, embedding connectivity into homes, factories, transportation networks, and utilities. China views the mastery of such systems not merely as an economic priority, but as a form of structural power, by enabling control over the technological environments in which individuals, organizations, and entire societies operate.
The IoT technological landscape spans a whole array of smart home technologies, infrastructure, business and offices etc. that affect the daily lives of entire economies. This includes smart home devices – ranging from voice-activated assistants and connected appliances to security cameras and thermostats – and even critical infrastructure components such as traffic systems, electric vehicles, financial terminals, and smart grids. In recent times, Chinese companies – such as Haier, TCL and Hisense among others – have gained dominance across all these sectors all over the world. At the same time, while these IoT devices offer utility and convenience to the people in their daily lives, they also contain embedded vulnerabilities. For, China’s digital security laws – based on a non-reciprocal model – make it mandatory for companies to allow the state to access data, including personal user data, while restricting the outflow of Chinese data outside of China’s borders. This means that in foreign markets data exfiltration easily takes place, allowing the Chinese state to gain access to sensitive data from other countries. This is because devices generate real-time data on user behaviours, locations, and habits, potentially feeding into surveillance ecosystems. This allows China to harvest user data for training artificial intelligence (AI) models, economic intelligence, or even for exercising geopolitical leverage.
In terms of geopolitical leverage, the deeper connectivity could enable China to use economic coercion and issue cybersecurity threats to achieve political objectives, through state-engineered disruptions. These risks are increasingly being flagged by Western countries and their allies, through demonstrations of how the Chinese-made IoT devices are already serving as attack vectors infiltrating critical infrastructure across the United States, Europe, Japan, and allied nations. In a recent low-key incident, the “LapDogs” espionage campaign hijacked over 1,000 routers and IoT devices across the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, turning them into operational relay boxes with custom backdoors to maintain stealthy, persistent access and facilitate downstream infiltration into corporate networks. Similarly, recently, British intelligence officials have issued security assessments over Chinese cellular IoT modules embedded in traffic systems, electric vehicles, financial terminals, and smart grids, warning that these modules could allow Beijing to freeze traffic lights, immobilize vehicles, or cut power remotely. In the United States, Chinese government-linked groups have leveraged vulnerable IoT endpoints, open to attacks, and successfully compromised networks like Massachusetts water utilities and Guam infrastructure. Although these minor infiltrations were rectified, they still reveal China’s deep penetration into critical infrastructure networks of other countries.
China’s strategy in the domain of IoT has been evolving since 2009-10, over successive five-year plans, and has accelerated under Xi Jinping. These developments herald new and more precarious future of technological development where the repercussions of state control over technology will not only change the landscape of geopolitics, by leading to less integration, more distrust, greater competition and more likelihood of wars, but also change the very nature of technology itself, wherein technology is utilized to exploit people’s greed and desire for utilitarian fulfilment.
Bihar SIR Exercise
The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar by the Election Commission (EC) has been hijacked by the din of political mudslinging, raising several questions about the exercise. The exercise was undertaken as part of the EC’s constitutional mandate to review voters across constituencies and weed out fake voters. However, political mudslinging has led to allegations that the exercise will lead to disenfranchisement of even valid voters. More significantly, a section of intellectuals and opposition leaders have sought to tie this exercise to something akin to the National Register of Citizens (NRC) which was stalled few years back due to widespread protests by Muslims. A constitutionally mandated exercise like the SIR is now being painted as an anti-minority exercise, with the EC accused of being in cahoots with the BJP.
The effect of the opposition accusations and obstructions boils down to the position that citizenship should not be verified. Such a position becomes particularly problematic in a country where the problem of illegal immigration, especially from Bangladesh to India’s border areas is particularly acute. Not only this, but the challenge of people manufacturing fake Aadhar cards and voter ID cards is also very common. It is quite commonplace to see one person possessing more than one voter ID card with different addresses/locations. Under such conditions, a periodic revision of electoral rolls on the part of the EC is not only much needed from a security point of view and it does not only constitute a power that the EC can legally exercise but is also its constitutional obligation, under Article 324, which it should be discharging regularly considering the Indian conditions under which the challenge of fake citizenship is rampant.
The Opposition’s attempts to politicize this issue proved to be futile and the issues raised point, in fact, to a deeper malaise plaguing the system:
First, the issue of documents that were being accepted by the EC as ‘valid’ documents for voter authenticity proved to be a major sticking point. Here, even though the Supreme Court refused to halt the exercise, it issued advise to the EC to broaden the scope of identity documents being considered for voter eligibility. In particular, the Court – supporting the Opposition’s contention – advised that other identity documents like Aadhar Card, Elector’s Photo Identity Card (EPIC) and ration cards should also be considered. This was particularly contentious.
It was refuted by the EC on the grounds that none of these cards can act as proof of citizenship. The Aadhar Act, 2016, under Section 9, clearly states that, “Aadhar Number or the Authentication thereof, shall not, by itself, confer any right of, or be proof of, citizenship or domicile in respect of the Aadhar number holder.” Similarly, ration cards are merely to claim welfare benefits. Furthermore, these cards can easily be made in a fake or duplicate format, resulting in the presence of foreigners on electoral rolls.
Second, these attempts by the Opposition – and to a certain extent by the Court through its ambivalent approach – point to a revival of the controversy surrounding citizenship. For, the Opposition, along other intellectual detractors, have sought to use this exercise to accuse the EC of conducting a citizenship survey akin to the NRC. However, what these detractors do not take into account is that it is the EC’s constitutional mandate to ensure that only citizens of India vote in elections. Article 326 clearly states that, “the Elections to the House of People and the Legislature of every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage, that is to say, every person who is a citizen of India and who is not less than 18 years of age in such State, as may be fixed in that behalf, by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under this Constitution or any Law made by the appropriate legislature” would be eligible to vote. Therefore, citizenship indeed becomes a requirement to exercise the right to vote. This is also reinforced by the Representation of People’s Act (RPA), 1950 which, under Section 16(1)(a), provides that a person who is not a citizen of India will be disqualified for being registered as a voter.
Third, the Opposition’s sensational claim that the EC is conducting this exercise just before the Bihar elections to influence the election result and disqualify potential Opposition voters, also does not stand up to scrutiny, and failed to cut much leverage in the Court. For the RPA, 1950, under Section 23(3), clearly states that the only period during which no amendment, transposition, inclusion or deletion of rolls is permitted is after the last date for making the nominations for an election in that constituency.
Fourth, it has been argued by the Opposition groups that ‘ordinary residence’ in a constituency is a valid criterion for inclusion in the electoral rolls. However, here, it is notable that the Court had, in one of its previous judgements (Dr. Yogesh Bharadwaj vs State of U.P And Ors, 1990 3 SCC 355) already provided clarity on this count. It had stated that it is only lawful residence that can be considered for certain purposes, and if a person stays in a country in breach of immigration laws, that person’s presence there does not constitute ordinary residence. Therefore, illegal immigrants cannot flout the citizenship criterion and claim voting rights merely based on ordinary residence.
Fifth, the Opposition has argued that voters already registered were also added through a ‘due process’ by the EC in the earlier years through summary revision of electoral rolls, and that in the absence of concrete complains against specific voters proving the existence of illegal immigrants, the EC could not undertake such an exercise. However, it is notable here that the EC has argued that a ‘special intensive revision’ (under Section 21(3) of the RPA, 1950) had more validity than just ‘summary’ revisions. Now this is based on interpretation, with the Opposition arguing that the Constitution does not anywhere make one type of revision more important than the other. However, it is notable that the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 were amended in 1987 to introduce two separate categories of electoral roll revisions, summary and intensive. The fact that such an amendment was made to distinguish the types of revisions lays waste the Opposition’s argument that summary revisions alone are enough or the Opposition’s attempts to conflate the two types of revisions to delegitimize intensive revision.
Sixth, the EC has also provided avenue for inclusion into electoral rolls in the SIR for those people who were already registered during the last such exercise conducted in Bihar in 2003. The EC guidelines for the present SIR clearly state that those included in the 2003 electoral rolls, and their children, would be exempted from furnishing any of the citizenship documents required in the 2025 SIR. It is also notable that the requirements for voter registration during the 2003 revision were mainly four – NRC Register where available, citizenship certificate, valid passport, or birth certificate. None of these requirements mention EPIC card or ration card.
Through all of these contentions, the weak but insidious nature of the opposition to the SIR becomes clearly visible. By raising questions about citizenship, the exercise points to the deeper malaise of illegal immigration plaguing the Indian system. The population, mobility and political vote banks constitute a mix that further makes it logistically and politically difficult to smoothly undertake such much needed exercises. Further, the manner in which the exercise is being conducted – through manipulations, or corruption – also reveals the negative role played by bureaucratic entrenchment and inertia which spoils the execution of even well-intended and much needed initiatives, thereby hampering state capacity to conduct such exercises.
- In 2024, the total trade volume between China and Russia reached a record high of USD 244.8 billion. For India it was USD 69 billion. ↑
- Office of the United States Trade Representative. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/russia-and-eurasia/russia#:~:text=U.S.%20goods%20and%20services%20trade,estimated%20%243.5%20billion%20in%202024. ↑
- European Commission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/russia_en. ↑
