Developments in Russia-Ukraine War
Emboldening Russia Via China:
The presence of Chinese President, Xi Jinping, besides other notable countries from the Global South, at Russia’s May 9th Victory Day parade, despite the ongoing war, has come as a major boost of legitimacy to Russia. Mr. Xi was on a full three-day visit to Russia and was accompanied by an entourage of aids and correspondents of such size that the Russian protocol department was stretched to the limit. In their joint declaration, Russia and China used the two bilateral statements – a Joint Declaration of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Further Strengthening Cooperation to Uphold the Authority of International Law, and a Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Global Strategic Stability – to emphasize their countries’ maintenance and strengthening of global stability and the international order.
The points of emphasis were deliberately chosen to resonate against the West, with talk of improving global governance, promoting multilateralism and stability, and protecting sovereignty. China also concurred with Russia’s interpretation of the war that the root causes of the war need to be addressed. This latest Putin-Xi meeting continued the slow consolidation of the PRC-Russia relationship that has been building for last several years. Despite the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, in the last two years alone, the two militaries have conducted numerous joint exercises from the Gulf of Finland and the Persian Gulf to the Bering Sea and the Sea of Japan, giving their collaboration a global hue.
Since the advent of Donald Trump, China has vigorously intensified its relations with Russia, and has gone out of the way to keep the latter out of America’s orbit.
Failure of Ceasefire:
Amid mounting calls for a ceasefire, the Ukrainian and Russian delegations met for the first time in Turkey. However, despite pressure from Ukraine, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, himself did not turn up. Indeed, the delegation that Russia sent to Istanbul was also so low-level that that itself became a message that Russia is not serious about a ceasefire. Furthermore, Russia also rejected the terms presented by Ukraine, decrying them as being formulated by the West, and instead presented its own terms.
As part of Russia’s conditionalities, it is insisting on “agreements” offered to Ukraine in Istanbul in March–April 2022. While there were no such “agreements,” Russia wants to incorporate parts of its own 2022 drafts into the terms of settlement. This is in contrast to Ukraine’s stand which, along with its European partners, wants a comprehensive ceasefire (land, air, sea) for at least 30 days, without preconditions. Such a ceasefire should precede any political-diplomatic process. Otherwise, Ukraine would be negotiating under the gun.
They also hoped that the Russian delegation would seamlessly proceed to a broader political dialogue in the same meeting. They, therefore, wished to see a high-level Russian delegation with the necessary authority to start that dialogue in Istanbul. Those hopes turned out again to be unfounded.
Broadly, Russian preconditions include:
- Ukraine will recognize Russia’s incorporation of Crimea and the entirety of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson provinces.
- Ukrainian troops will withdraw from the portions they still hold in those four mainland provinces.
- No Western troops (from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states) will oversee an eventual armistice on Ukraine’s remaining territory.
- Kyiv will renounce its claims to Russia for war damage reparations.
Russia has not only attached those preconditions to a ceasefire agreement but has also listed them as elements of an eventual political settlement. Additionally, Moscow and Kyiv agreed to exchange prisoners of war on a 1,000-for-1,000-basis, becoming the largest one-time exchange of prisoners in this war thus far.
The failure of the negotiations has, for now, dashed hopes of the ceasefire. The failed negotiations reveal the limitations of the American policy towards the war under Donald Trump. By creating a divide with Ukraine and Europe and by threatening to ‘walk away’ in case the negotiations fail, the American attitude has emboldened Russia to an extent not seen in the last three years.
Technology Update
China has made a significant breakthrough in the field of cyber electromagnetic warfare. This form of warfare lies at the intersection of kinetic/military and non-kinetic forms of warfare. It is a form of informatized warfare in which the adversary’s information, communications and electromagnetic systems can be crippled, by targeting the adversary’s command, control, and communication infrastructure.
As part of this wider mode of warfare, China, through its People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is now rapidly expanding its arsenal of high-power microwave (HPM) weapons. This will help to give China advantage in the electromagnetic spectrum. The PLA aims to integrate these HPM weapons into its asymmetric warfare tool kit, enabling disruption of adversary electronic systems. HPMs target the central nodes that hold technologically advanced militaries together, making them a critical weapon in future conflicts, including a Taiwan contingency. The PLA is likely to synchronize HPM strikes with cyber-attacks to paralyze critical infrastructure, giving it a rapid battlefield advantage. This breakthrough will pose significant threats to the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Interestingly, China’s interest in this area goes back to its Cold War era research on electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. During the time of Cold War, U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests in the 1960s revealed that high-altitude nuclear detonations produced electromagnetic pulse that could disable or destroy electronics. Following these tests, China was quick to integrate these nuclear EMP weapons into their broader approach to information and cyber capabilities. For China, these weapons represented an effective asymmetric capability designed to even the playing field against technologically superior adversaries, such as the United States.
In today’s time, when China’s adversaries like the US have increased their reliance on an array of electronics for their increasingly integrated networks of weapons and communication equipment, advanced non-nuclear EMP weapons like HPM systems can be used as an effective asymmetric warfare strategy by China, without the threat of nuclear escalation.
Today, China’s advantage in this field has made it a dominant player in the research on these weapons. As of 2022, 90 percent of all new HPM-related patents globally belong to PRC-affiliated researchers and organizations.
