Up until a few years ago, it was difficult to imagine the idea of a consolidated Hindu vote-bank. This idea implies that Hindus would express their electoral preferences in accordance with their religious identity first and foremost. However, since, politically, the Hindu identity has been so deeply riven by caste and Jati sub-identities, the decades-old attempts of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) to forge a consolidated Hindu identity in the political domain (or, Hindutva) has usually yielded mild results. Till as recently as the Lok Sabha elections of 2024, the victory-like-defeat received by the BJP-led ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has borne out this fact, as one of the key reasons behind the BJP’s marginal and narrow victory in the Lok Sabha elections was attributable to the insecurity of the Dalits and other marginalized castes against the BJP’s hegemonic campaign rhetoric.
In view of the drubbing received by the BJP in the recent Lok Sabha elections, its comprehensive victory in the recent Haryana assembly elections and its positive performance in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) assembly elections soon after the Lok Sabha election, may have taken the country by surprise. Yet, if we look at the broader movement, it is not a surprise. Both, BJP’s dilution in Lok Sabha elections as well as its victory in the subsequent Haryana assembly elections signal a broad trend of deepening of political Hindu consolidation independent of local factors. While in Jammu and Kashmir, this trend was explicit with Hindu-majority Jammu rallying around the BJP and punishing the Congress. In Haryana, where religious polarization has not been a major factor and caste identities play a pivotal role, BJP’s ability to hold onto sections of its Dalit and Jat vote-banks against odds signals a broadening of the BJP’s base along Hindutva lines, independent of local factors. The simple idea that BJP has been successfully able to undertake non-dominant caste mobilization at the state level is no longer sufficient in explaining the recent political changes. What is being witnessed is the construction of new political identities which are likely to survive beyond the BJP’s changing electoral fortunes.
Electoral Trends in Haryana and J&K:
In Haryana, the BJP’s comprehensive victory is widely being touted as a hattrick, with the party having won a historical third term in the 90-member state assembly. This is significant as, since 1966, no party has won a third consecutive term in the state assembly. The BJP’s victory in the state also defied all exit poll predictions which had given a thumping majority to the Congress party in the state.
Haryana: Seat share and Vote share
|
Seat share in 2024 |
Seat share in 2019 | Vote share in 2024 (%) | Vote share in 2019 (%) | |
| BJP | 48 | 40 | 39.94 | 36.5 |
| INC | 37 | 31 | 39.09 | 28.08 |
| INLD | 2 | 1 | 4.14 | 2.44 |
| JJP | 0 | 10 | 0.9 | 14.8 |
From the broad trend, while the BJP has been able to, both retain and slightly expand its vote-base in the state, the Indian National Congress (INC) has also been able to significantly expand its vote share and seat share. The main loser in the process has been Dushyant Chautala’s Jannayak Janata Party (JJP) which has lost nearly all ground, with its Jat vote share shifting to the national parties. While Congress was the main beneficiary of the hit taken by the regional parties, even BJP managed to get some part of their vote share, besides retaining its own vote-base. The trend signals the breaking up of regional forces in Haryana, which, since the formation of the state, have played a pivotal role in Haryana politics.
In the 90-member J&K assembly, the polarization along regional-cum-religious lines between Muslim-majority Kashmir and Hindu-majority Jammu yielded the expected BJP victory in Jammu and defeat in Kashmir. Significantly, while NC may have won more seats, BJP emerged as the single largest party in terms of its vote share. Not only this, but the BJP victory from J&K was historic in the sense that the party posted its highest ever tally in these elections.
J&K: Seat share and Vote share
| Seat share in 2024 | Seat share in 2014 | Vote share in 2024 (%) | Vote share in 2014 (%) | |
| JKNC | 42 | 15 | 23.4 | 20.7 |
| BJP | 29 | 25 | 25.6 | 22.9 |
| INC | 6 | 12 | 11.9 | 18.01 |
| PDP | 3 | 28 | 8.87 | 22.67 |
Beyond the larger trend of religious polarization along regional lines between Jammu and Kashmir, what is significant in the result is the utter defeat of Congress from both the regions. Mehbooba Mufti’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is also moving towards the expected oblivion. The elections, thus breaking the long hold of Congress and PDP in J&K’s electoral matrix, now signal the rise of BJP as the principal challenger to Omar Abdullah’s Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) in the territory. Further, the Congress’s comprehensive loss among Hindus in Jammu – having won only 1 seat from Jammu and 5 from Kashmir – also reinforces its strengthening image as not a secular, but as a Muslim party.
Key Fault lines in Haryana
In Haryana, urban-rural divide and caste were significant factors, while religion played a minuscule role.
Urban-rural divide: Vote share (%):
| BJP | INC+ | Others | ||||
| 2024 (%) | Difference from 2019 (+/-) (%) | 2024 (%) | Difference from 2019 (+/-) (%) | 2024 (%) | Difference from 2019 (+/-) (%) | |
| Urban | 48.8 | 0.2 | 27.7 | 4.6 | 23.5 | -4.8 |
| Semi-urban | 46 | 5.1 | 33.6 | 4.8 | 20.4 | -9.9 |
| Semi-rural | 37.8 | 0.8 | 46.3 | 12.6 | 15.9 | -13.4 |
| Rural | 36.4 | 4.7 | 40.4 | 14.7 | 23.2 | -19.4 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey
Urban-rural divide: Seat share:
| BJP | INC+ | Others | ||||
| 2024 | Difference from 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | Difference from 2019 (+/-) | 2024 (%) | Difference from 2019 (+/-) | |
| Urban | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Semi-urban | 11 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Semi-rural | 13 | 2 | 11 | -1 | 1 | -1 |
| Rural | 17 | 6 | 21 | 7 | 2 | -13 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey
The results across the urban-rural landscape show that the urban-rural divide is quite marked. While BJP has outdone the Congress in urban, semi-urban and semi-rural areas, its performance in rural areas has not been too bad either. While the Congress has gained vote-share across rural areas, it lost seats in these areas compared to the last election. This is because Congress could not convert its vote share gains into seat share, as its highest vote share gains in rural areas were concentrated only in a few seats rather than being spread out. Significantly, Congress’s victories in the rural areas were concentrated in particularly those seats which were Muslim-dominated like Nuh, Ferozepur Jhirka and Punahana, and some which were farmer-dominated. In farmer-intensive seats, Congress made the highest vote share gains (greater than 40%) in seats where cultivators and agricultural workers make up more than 65% of the total workforce. In seats where the share of agricultural workers was less than 50%, Congress did not make significant vote share gains (less than 5%).
In rural seats where Muslim domination and farmer domination was not visible, largely, the BJP was more successful than the Congress.
Vote share (%) in reserved and general seats:
| Type of seat | BJP | INC+ | Others | |||
| 2024 | Difference from 2019 (+/-) (%) | 2024 | Difference from 2019 (+/-) (%) | 2024 | Difference from 2019 (+/-) (%) | |
| General | 39.1 | 1.9 | 38.3 | 10.6 | 22.6 | -12.5 |
| Reserved for SC | 44 | 10.6 | 44 | 13.8 | 12 | -24.4 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey
Both BJP and Congress have performed well across general and reserved seats.
Caste and community-wise vote share (%) in Haryana:
| Congress | BJP | INLD+BSP | Others | |
| Brahmin | 31 | 51 | 2 | 16 |
| Punjabi Khatri | 18 | 68 | 4 | 10 |
| Jat | 53 | 28 | 6 | 13 |
| Other upper caste | 22 | 59 | 4 | 15 |
| Gujjar | 44 | 37 | 5 | 14 |
| Yadav | 25 | 62 | 2 | 11 |
| Other OBCs | 32 | 47 | 8 | 13 |
| Jatav Dalits | 50 | 35 | 6 | 9 |
| Other SCs | 33 | 45 | 10 | 12 |
| Muslim | 59 | 7 | 3 | 31 |
| Sikh | 47 | 21 | 17 | 15 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey
From the caste and community vote shares, it is clear that BJP could successfully retain Dalits and dent Congress’s Jat voter base. One in three Jats voted for the BJP. It also did well among OBCs, (except Gujjars) and among upper castes.
There were several factors at play in Haryana:
First, the supposed issues which dented the BJP during the Lok Sabha elections – danger to the Constitution, sidelining of the Dalits and OBCs etc. – failed to resonate much with the voters during Haryana state elections. Even Haryana-centric issues which were expected to have wider political impact – such as grievances against the Agnipath scheme, farmers’ protests, wrestlers’ protests and unemployment – did not yield the desired political outcomes for the Congress party. Indeed, wrestlers’ and farmers’ protests fell completely flat, with wrestler Vinesh Phogat winning her seat by a highly narrow margin of few thousand votes only. Thus, the meticulously crafted rhetoric of ‘jawan, kisan, pehelwan’ failed to dent the BJP.
Second, BJP sought to campaign on the basis of its largely decent track record, transparency in governance, and fighting corruption and nepotism. More significantly, smart ticket distribution and countering anti-incumbency by replacing former Chief Minister, ML Khattar, with Nayab Singh Saini late during the term of the previous assembly, worked well for the BJP. Out of the nearly 25 seats where the BJP replaced party candidates, the party won close to 15 seats.
Third, the traditional BJP formula of non-dominant caste consolidation (in Haryana’s case, the Jat community) yielded results in this election too. Part of the reason behind this was the Congress’s excessive focus on the Jats. The non-Jats, primarily the backward classes, which form nearly 35% of the state’s population supported the BJP. Dalits too did not desert the party, as is evident from the increase in BJP’s reserved seats. Significantly, the Jats in several districts of the state supported the BJP.
Finally, the most important reason for BJP’s victory in the state was the hard work and effort put in by the RSS karyakartas in the run-up to the election. The RSS workers held extensive meetings, campaigns and mobilization outreach activities across the state in an attempt to foil the Congress’s caste arithmetic (of uniting Jats and Dalits), and the results show that it was successful to a significant extent.
Key Fault lines in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
In J&K, the election was being painted as being a referendum on the constitutional changes brought about in the aftermath of August 5th, 2019, with the revocation of Article 370 by the central government. In large measure it was, but to a limited extent. Yet, traditional parties like NC and Congress refrained from making any concrete promises to bring back Article 370 which had guaranteed a separate constitutional status to the former state. Instead, the focus was on bringing back statehood to the present Union Territory. Even among Independents (largely, former separatists and militants), the key discourse centered more around local issues such as corruption and public services vis-à-vis regional parties, and so-called suppression of freedom vis-à-vis central government.
Regional vote share across J&K (%):
| INDIA (NC+INC+CPIM) | BJP | PDP | Independents | |
| Kashmir | 42.4 | 2.2 | 16.3 | 21.2 |
| Jammu | 32.8 | 45.2 | 2.7 | 12.8 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey
Majority religion-wise vote share (%):
| INDIA | BJP | PDP | Independents | |
| High Hindu majority | 28.4 | 54.3 | 0.4 | 10.1 |
| High Muslim majority | 41.9 | 4.1 | 15.4 | 21.9 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey
Parties’ performance across regions:
| Regions | Total seats | NC-Congress | BJP | PDP | AIP | Independents | Others | ||||||
| Won | Vote (%) | Won | Vote (%) | Won | Vote (%) | Won | Vote (%) | Won | Vote (%) | Won | Vote (%) | ||
| Kashmir | 47 | 40 | 41.08 | 0 | 2.17 | 3 | 16.32 | 0 | 1.97 | 2 | 16.82 | 2 | 21.64 |
| Jammu | 43 | 8 | 30.67 | 29 | 45.23 | 0 | 2.66 | 0 | 0.00 | 5 | 12.84 | 1 | 8.6 |
| Overall | 90 | 48 | 35.4 | 29 | 25.64 | 3 | 8.87 | 0 | 0.9 | 7 | 14.65 | 3 | 14.54 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey
There were several factors at play in J&K:
First, the breath of NC’s victory is comprehensive, having cornered the traditional voters of both PDP and Congress. It was NC’s first such performance after winning 57 seats in the 1996 elections, sweeping all seats in Srinagar, Budgam and Ganderbal in Kashmir Valley. It also replaced PDP in the Mufti’s traditional stronghold of south Kashmir, winning 10 out 16 seats there. It improved its performance in the Pir Panjal valley and Chenab valley in Jammu by winning 6 out of 16 seats.
Second, while the BJP failed to win a single seat in Kashmir, it swept the predominantly Hindu areas in Jammu, winning Jammu, Samba, Udhampur and Kathua. Unlike in Pir Panjal, the party did well in Chenab valley winning four seats. It is important to note that almost 70 percent of the seats across J&K were demographically challenging for the BJP, as not entire Jammu is Hindi-dominated. At least 16 seats across 5 Jammu districts have Muslim domination, including Doda, Kishtwar, Ramban, Poonch, and Rajouri. Thus, across J&K, there are 63 seats with a Muslim-majority population and 27 with a Hindu majority (Tiwari, 2024).
Third, in terms of reserved seats, the BJP, as expected performed well in Hindu-dominated SC reserved seats having won all of them, while the INDI Alliance took away the Muslim-dominated ST reserved seats. All seven SC-reserved seats and six out of nine ST-reserved seats fall in Jammu. The BJP could not win a single ST-reserved seat in Jammu, including the in districts of Rajouri, Poonch and Reasi. The performance in these reserved seats was significant because they were created in the aftermath of the revocation of Article 370. The Centre had further increased the scope of ST-reserved seats by including Paharis – which make up majority of voters in Rajouri and Poonch – within them. The extension of reservation to Paharis angered the Gujjars, while even a section of Paharis voted for NC-Congress. As a result, BJP performed below the mark in ST-reserved seats.
Broad Patterns of Political Mobilization
First, the most visible pattern – which will have resonance across North India – is the movement from regionalization towards nationalization. With BJP and Congress cornering about 80% of the vote share between themselves in Harayana, the space for regional parties has shrunk completely. Significant here is the nationalization of the Jat vote-bank in Haryana. Its movement towards the two national parties, particularly the BJP which has strongly been perceived as an anti-farmer and anti-Jat party is significant. The election appears to have broken the entrenched hold of Jat family dynasties like Chautalas over the system, while also denying space to potential new regional parties like Aam Admi Party (AAP) despite Kejriwal’s Haryana connection and past breakthroughs. JJP which had commanded a vote share of nearly 15% in the last election not only plummeted its vote share to less than 1%, but also Dushyant Chautala lost his security deposit from Uchana Kalan – the Chautala family bastion – to BJP.
It shows not only the limitations of identity politics and regional forces, but also reinforces the idea that, at some level, national loyalties and religious identity are beginning to trump narrow regional loyalties and caste identities.
Second, from the J&K results, a significant pattern of mobilization has been the decline of extremist forces in the territory. This is visible through four main patterns:
- The voter turnout in the territory has been impressively high this time. It is significant that even in areas of Kashmir where voters used to boycott elections in the past (under the call of Islamic clerics and terrorists), the turnout has been significant. This humble indicator shows the rising legitimacy of Indian national institutions in Kashmir.
- The fact that BJP could expand its organization in certain parts in Kashmir (such as Guarez in southern Kashmir which used to be a militancy-prone area) emerging as a principal challenger to the winner shows that despite its overall loss in Kashmir, BJP’s acceptability in Kashmir cannot be dismissed, and has indeed risen despite all odds.
- Extremist forces – such as the independents fielded by the banned Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), and other extremists – did not make any headway in terms of popularity, with people in Kashmir preferring to vote along established party lines. These extremist forces have espoused a radical Islamic agenda and have had a historical record of fueling Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in the Valley. At the same time, the fact that JeI sought to participate in these elections at all was itself a significant occurrence, regardless of the results.
The last time the Islamic radicals, under JeI, had participated in the elections in the region was during the infamous 1987 elections under the banner of the Muslim United Front. The elections are remembered for having been rigged by the Congress-NC combine. This was followed by a brutal phase of terrorism and Pandit genocide in Kashmir from 1989 onwards. It was, thus, after many decades that such outlawed radicals attempted to participate in the electoral process. The trend indicates that people in the Valley have realized that there exists no alternative to India and that resistance is futile.
- Finally, geopolitics has had no mean influence on the decline of extremism in Kashmir. Some key patterns include the marginalization of Pakistan and its forceful subordination to India through events such as Uri and Balakot strikes, the hatred between Afghan Taliban and Pakistan, and the changing dynamics in the Middle east where Israel’s comprehensive operations have nearly destroyed Iran’s capabilities and where Sunni Arab countries have merely responded in a lukewarm manner. All these factors have impacted Kashmir significantly.
Pakistan’s weakening and its feud with Taliban in Afghanistan has shifted the locus of terrorism towards Pakistan. Unlike in the 1990s, when Pakistan and Afghan Taliban had joined hands to fuel militancy in Kashmir and when Pakistan had a favourable geopolitical position with both United States and China, and was flush with money, this is no longer the case at present. Today Pakistan is barely able to control its own internal insurgencies and political upheavals, and its economic impoverishment appears to have become too deeply ingrained. Another source of militant funding in Kashmir came from the powerful clerics and madrassas in Saudi Arabia and Iran. Here also, the dynamics have completely changed now. Saudi Arabia is characterized by a trend towards modernization and commercialism, a sidelining of Muslim clerics, and a massive improvement of bilateral relations between Modi regime and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammad bin Salman, while Iran has become too occupied with its own geopolitical troubles to focus on Kashmir any longer. It is now an indirect but significant part of an active war with Israel, and ever since the Russia-Ukraine war, its closer relations with Russia has shifted Iran’s geopolitical export of Islam more towards Russia.
The decline in extremist forces visible through these trends is likely to reflect in the future governance of the union territory. This was evident in the statements made by the new Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah, after winning the elections. Unlike the acrimonious position taken by the NC during the campaign, Mr. Abdullah refrained from mentioning Article 370 and struck a conciliatory tone by declaring his intention to work with the central government. The usual sermons by Abdullahs about seeking reconciliation with Pakistan were also missing. In view of recent geopolitical changes and with J&K downgraded to a union territory status, thereby restricting the Chief Minister’s powers, the new leadership probably realizes that its avenues of seeking anti-national sources of financial and political autonomy are limited and that its best bet to remain in power would be to remain on good terms with the central government. It also realizes that it could benefit from the massive public and private investments that continue to be infused into the union territory after 2019 if it seeks a productive rather than an antagonistic relationship with the centre.
Further, the election of the J&K legislative assembly and its new Chief Minister is unlikely to impact governance in a major way. Being a union territory, there are only a limited set of areas that the assembly can legislate upon. As per the J&K Reorganization Act, 2019, the assembly can legislate on matters within the State List and Concurrent List, excluding police and public order. Further as per the Act, the assembly will also have no say on subjects under education, marriage, taxation, property transfers, forests, trade unions, labour welfare, charitable organizations and trade and commerce. Few days before the elections were announced, the Union Home Ministry made some amendments to the rules under the 2019 Act, giving more powers to the L-G in matters related to police, public order and All India Services, including transfers and postings. These changes have completely restricted the powers of the assembly to exercise any major autonomy in lawmaking. It is no wonder that Mr. Abdullah has been consistently reminding the centre of the promise to restore statehood the J&K.
Conclusion
The recently concluded state elections have come as a much-needed psychological boost for the ruling BJP at the national level, and may provide the needed ammunition to the party in subsequent state elections to be held in Maharashtra and Jharkhand. In the aftermath of the drubbing received by the party in the Lok Sabha elections, these state elections were widely perceived to be a test of BJP’s actual position in Indian politics. These doubts have now been dispelled to a significant extent. The role of the RSS in undertaking active political mobilization for the BJP has been one of the primary catalysts of BJP’s performance in both Haryana and J&K – something that was conspicuously missing during the Lok Sabha elections. The energetic mobilization by the RSS shows that the appeal of Hindutva not only extends to the domain of religious unity but can also dent caste rigidities when undertaken properly.
Bibliography
Tiwari, A. (2024, October 15). India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/opinion/story/how-bjp-won-most-votes-but-didnt-win-jammu-and-kashmir-opinion-2617029-2024-10-15
