The Lok Sabha election results have dealt an unexpected blow to the ruling dispensation, a much-needed reality check about the demographics that the ruling party had taken for granted, and a deeper message to the country and its political ruling class. It is significant that this is the first time, since 1962, that a Prime Minister is elected three times in a row, with Narendra Modi being the only Prime Minister after Jawaharlal Nehru to set this record. However, Prime Minister Modi, for the first time in his political service, will be leading a coalition government. For, while the ruling Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) did emerge as the single largest party, the heavy defeat suffered by the BJP, particularly in the Hindi heartland, is a far cry from the goal of 400 seats that it had set for its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition. The results also betray the entirely off-the-mark projections made by the Exit Polls, many of which had projected the NDA to comfortably win between 280-300 or more seats. More significantly, the losses suffered by the BJP stand out even more starkly when compared with its own past stellar performance in the last two general elections. The results have, thus, led to immense introspection within the party. To understand the results, it is necessary to look at the performance nationwide as well as in key states where the BJP ended up losing most of its seats.
Decoding the Nationwide Mandate
At the national level, while the ruling BJP emerged as the single largest party with 240 seats, it was well short of the majority mark of 272. NDA received 294 seats, enabling it to form a coalition government dependent on key allies like Nitish Kumar’s Janta Dal (United) (JD(U)) which won 12 seats, and Chandrababu Naidu’s Telugu Desam Party (TDP) which won 16 seats. In a marked contrast to the last Lok Sabha election, the Opposition’s Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) emerged with a substantial 232 seats, of which the Congress, the largest constituent of the Opposition, received 99 seats.
While the vote share of the NDA had come down from 44.4% in 2019[1] to 42.8% in 2024, that of the INDIA had risen from 33.7% in 2019 to 40.6% in 2024. In terms of vote-shares of the largest individual constituents, while the BJP’s vote share decline slightly from 37.7% in 2019 to 36.6% in 2024, the vote share of the Congress increased from 19.7% in 2019 to 21.2% in 2024.
Further, of the 286 seats where the BJP and the Congress were in direct contest, the BJP beat the Congress in 183 seats.
Election year | Seats in direct contest between BJP and INC | Seats won by BJP | BJP strike rate (%) | Seats won by INC | INC strike rate (%) |
2014 | 370 | 236 | 63.8 | 36 | 9.7 |
2019 | 374 | 257 | 68.7 | 31 | 8.3 |
2024 | 286 | 183 | 64 | 81 | 28.3 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
However, it is notable that the strike rate of the Congress – the proportion of seats won out of those contested by the party – has vastly improved over 2014 and 2019 elections in the seats which saw direct contest with the BJP, while the BJP strike rate has gone down a little.
Region-wise performance:
Regions | NDA (vote share %) | INDIA (vote share %) | Others (vote share %) | ||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | ||
Hindi heartland states | 48.9 | -2.3 | 41 | 11.2 | 10 | -9 | |
Non-Hindi northern states | 20.8 | 2.6 | 49.5 | 4.1 | 29.7 | -6.7 | |
Southern states | 36.7 | 7.6 | 40.4 | 7.1 | 22.8 | -14.8 | |
Western states | 50.4 | -14.4 | 34.5 | 12.4 | 15.1 | 1.9 | |
Eastern states | 40.3 | 0.7 | 11.6 | 2.5 | 48.1 | -3.2 | |
Northeastern states | 44.1 | -1.5 | 38.9 | 4.2 | 17 | -2.7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
From the above data broadly, the NDA saw the most significant losses in the West followed by the Hindi heartland. These include states like Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan and Maharashtra, where the BJP-led coalition ended up losing most seats. The coalition saw a significant 7.6% vote share increase in the southern states and some increase in non-Hindi speaking states in the North, but this was not enough to offset the losses it had suffered elsewhere.
State-wise breakdown of regional vote and seat shares in key states:
West:
Party | Goa[2] | Gujarat[3] | Maharashtra[4] | |||||||||
Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | |||||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 1 | 0 | 50.9 | -0.5 | 25 | -1 | 61.8 | -0.5 | 17 | -28 | 43.6 | -22.8 |
INDIA | 1 | 0 | 39.6 | -6.3 | 1 | 1 | 34 | 1.9 | 30 | 29 | 44 | 27.6 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 9.5 | 6.8 | 0 | 0 | 4.2 | -1.4 | 1 | -1 | 12.4 | -4.8 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
As is evident, the major losses for the NDA in the West came from Maharashtra, where the split factions of Shiv Sena and NCP which had gone with the INDIA had won in many seats where they were in direct contest with their split counterparts. The unpopularity of Ajit Pawar’s NCP may have also affected NDA’s vote share. The political atmosphere was also vitiated due to the Maratha quota stir, which exacerbated the divide between Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Maratha and worked to the disadvantage of the NDA. Surprisingly, Congress, with 13 seats, emerged as the single largest party in the state, thereby making a significant comeback. The BJP won 9 of the 28 seats it had contested.
Demographic breakdown in Maharashtra vote shares (%):
Congress (17%) | Congress allies (27%) | BJP (26%) | BJP allies (17%) | Others (13%) | |
Rural | 16 | 32 | 23 | 13 | 15 |
Urban | 18 | 19 | 30 | 24 | 9 |
Upper caste | 18 | 20 | 33 | 25 | 4 |
Maratha-Kunbi | 14 | 25 | 27 | 19 | 16 |
OBCs | 11 | 28 | 33 | 17 | 11 |
Dalits | 19 | 27 | 24 | 11 | 19 |
Adivasis | 23 | 32 | 30 | 5 | 10 |
Men | 17 | 29 | 26 | 18 | 10 |
Women | 17 | 25 | 27 | 16 | 15 |
Poor | 15 | 42 | 17 | 15 | 11 |
Rich | 18 | 22 | 35 | 18 | 7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Further, the BJP, after the splintering of Shiv Sena and NCP, lost complete control over the Mumbai-Thane-Nashik urban areas. It also lost clout in rural areas of Vidarbha and Marathawada.
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Gujarat:
Congress | BJP | |
Upper caste | 25 | 71 |
Patel/Patidar | 6 | 80 |
Kshatriya | 39 | 58 |
Other OBCs | 23 | 68 |
Dalit | 46 | 54 |
Adivasi | 41 | 49 |
Muslim | 59 | 29 |
Others | 9 | 80 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Gujarat, the BJP’s dominance continues unbroken. Its core vote base remains upper caste, Patidars and other OBCs. Despite much political controversy, the party managed to retain substantial Kshatriya vote share too. Amongst the Dalits and Adivasis, the vote share was split between Congress and BJP. The ‘Modi factor’ played an important role, with nearly 27% of the voters averring that had Modi not been the PM candidate, they would have voted differently.
Non-Hindi North:
Party | Jammu and Kashmir | Ladakh | ||||||
Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | |||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
INDIA | 2 | -1 | 42.2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 27.6 | 10.8 |
NDA | 2 | 0 | 24.4 | -22.5 | 0 | -1 | 23.6 | -10.3 |
Others | 1 | 1 | 33.4 | 17.5 | 1 | 1 | 48.8 | -0.5 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
J&K results saw a deadlock between NDA and the Opposition, with BJP and NC winning two seats each. Interestingly, two former Chief Ministers – Mehbooba Mufti from PDP and Omar Abdullah from NC – lost from Baramulla and Anantnag-Rajouri. While Mr. Abdullah lost to AIP-backed independent candidate Engineer Rashid who has been in jail on charges of separatism, Ms. Mufti lost to NC’s Mian Altaf Larvi. BJP won both its seats from Hindu-majority Jammu region, but with much reduced margins and vote share compared to 2019. In Srinagar, NC defeated the PDP. All BJP-backed candidates lost in Kashmir valley.
In Ladakh, BJP slipped to the third position, as an independent candidate, Mr. Haji Hanifa Jan, won. He was supported by a section of people from Congress and NC and could therefore defeat the INDIA candidate by winning over 65,000 votes. While the INDIA candidate secured 37,397 votes, BJP came third with 31,956 votes. Over the past two years, Ladakh has seen consistent protests and discontent against the central government, with agitations for key demands like grant of statehood and inclusion of Ladakh in the Sixth Schedule in order to protect its land and jobs from ‘outsiders.’
Party | Punjab | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
INC | 7 | -1 | 26.3 | -13.8 |
NDA | 0 | -2 | 18.6 | 8.8 |
AAP | 3 | 2 | 26 | 18.6 |
SAD | 1 | -1 | 13.4 | -14 |
Others | 2 | 2 | 15.5 | 0.5 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
While Punjab voted heavily against the BJP, the results revealed a return of communal polarization with the victory of two separatist Sikh candidates, Amritpal Singh and Sarabjeet Singh Khalsa. While one is in jail, the other is the son of former Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi’s assassin.
East:
Party | Odisha | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
INDIA | 1 | 0 | 13.2 | -1.5 |
NDA | 20 | 12 | 45.5 | 7.1 |
BJD | 0 | -12 | 37.5 | -5.3 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 3.8 | -0.3 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Party | Sikkim | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 0 | 0 | 4.9 | 0.2 |
INDIA | 0 | 0 | 0.6 | -0.5 |
SKM | 1 | 0 | 42.7 | -4.8 |
SDF | 0 | 0 | 20 | -23.9 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 31.8 | 29 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Party | West Bengal | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
AITC | 29 | 7 | 45.8 | 2.5 |
INDIA[5] | 1 | -1 | 11 | 4.2 |
NDA | 12 | -6 | 38.7 | -1.7 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 4.4 | -5.1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee’s All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) made big improvements compared to 2019 elections. It not only swept the southern parts of the state, but also made inroads into BJP strongholds of Jangalmahal and north Bengal. In north Bengal, the BJP won 6 out of 8 seats, including 2 in Jangalmahal and in regions bordering Bangladesh where Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) resonated with the people.
Hindi Heartland:
Party | Bihar[6] | Chhattisgarh | Delhi[7] | |||||||||
Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | |||||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 30 | -9 | 47.3 | -12.5 | 10 | 1 | 52.7 | 1.6 | 7 | 0 | 54.4 | -2.2 |
INDIA | 9 | 8 | 39.2 | 13.6 | 1 | -1 | 41.3 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 43 | 2.4 |
Others | 1 | 1 | 13.5 | -1.1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | -1.7 | 0 | 0 | 2.6 | -0.2 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Bihar:
NDA | NDA: Change from 2019 (+/-) | INDIA | INDIA: Change from 2019 (+/-) | |
Upper caste | 53 | -15 | 10 | 2 |
Koeri+ Kurmi | 67 | -12 | 19 | 9 |
Yadav | 26 | 8 | 73 | 9 |
Other OBCs | 54 | -21 | 14 | <1 |
Dusadh/Pasi | 65 | -19 | 35 | 28 |
Other SCs | 58 | -18 | 42 | 38 |
Muslims | 12 | 6 | 87 | 7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Bihar, while NDA broadly retained its core vote bases, it lost votes across all communities and only made some gains among Muslims and Yadavs. INDIA, on the other hand, made significant gains among the Dalits, including Pasis, while retaining its core Muslim-Yadav vote bank.
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Delhi:
Congress | AAP | BJP | |
Upper caste | 14 | 12 | 71 |
OBCs | 19 | 20 | 58 |
Dalits | 20 | 28 | 49 |
Muslims | 34 | 49 | 14 |
Poor class | 21 | 24 | 52 |
Middle class | 16 | 32 | 50 |
Upper class | 20 | 19 | 59 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Delhi, the combined vote share of Congress and AAP (the INDI Alliance) increased a little compared to 2019. Despite that, its combined vote share was 11 percentage points lower than that of the BJP. The BJP received support across all castes and classes. The arrest of Mr. Kejriwal and the sympathy wave that the Opposition hoped to create around it backfired spectacularly.
Party | Himachal Pradesh | Haryana | Jharkhand[8] | |||||||||
Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | |||||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 4 | 0 | 56.4 | -12.7 | 5 | -5 | 46.1 | -12 | 9 | -3 | 47.2 | -13.2 |
INDIA | 0 | 0 | 41.7 | 14.2 | 5 | 5 | 47.8 | 18.9 | 5 | 3 | 39.6 | 9.5 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 1.9 | -1.5 | 0 | 0 | 6.1 | -7 | 0 | 0 | 13.2 | 3.7 |
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Haryana compared to 2019:
INC | BJP | |
Jat | 64 (+31) | 27 (-23) |
Upper castes | 30 (+12) | 66 (-8) |
OBCs | 51 (+29) | 44 (-29) |
SCs | 68 (+40) | 24 (-34) |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Haryana, the BJP lost vote shares among all castes. Some of the main issues that adversely affected the ruling BJP in Haryana were anti-incumbency, farmer discontent, misconceptions around the Agniveer scheme, unemployment, inflation etc. The Congress successfully penetrated the non-Jat base of BJP, making inroads among baniyas, upper castes, and OBCs. Even the SC vote, which used to be traditionally split between BJP and BSP, moved heavily towards the Congress.
Party | Madhya Pradesh | Rajasthan | Uttarakhand | |||||||||
Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | |||||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 29 | 1 | 59.3 | 1.2 | 14 | -10 | 49.2 | -9.3 | 5 | 0 | 56.9 | -4.1 |
INDIA | 0 | -1 | 32.9 | -2.1 | 11 | 10 | 45 | 8.6 | 0 | 0 | 32.7 | 1.3 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 7.7 | 0.9 | 0 | 0 | 5.7 | 0.6 | 0 | 0 | 10.4 | 2.8 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Rajasthan:
Congress-led INDIA | BJP | Others | |
Upper caste | 26 | 65 | 9 |
Hindu OBCs | 39 | 59 | 3 |
Hindu Dalits | 46 | 37 | 17 |
Hindu Adivasis | 40 | 46 | 14 |
Muslims | 68 | 14 | 19 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Rajasthan, Congress performed well in the northern and eastern parts of the state which share borders with UP, Haryana and Punjab and saw active farmers protests as well as discontent against the Agniveer scheme. The BJP managed to retain its strongholds in central, south-eastern and western Rajasthan. While Congress drew greater support among economically and socially marginalized sections, BJP’s support came mainly from rich and upper caste voters.
Demographic breakdown in vote share (%) in Madhya Pradesh:
Congress | BJP | Others | |
Rural | 28 | 62 | 9 |
Urban | 41 | 53 | 6 |
Men | 31 | 59 | 10 |
Women | 34 | 60 | 6 |
Hindu upper caste | 20 | 72 | 8 |
Hindu upper OBC | 28 | 63 | 9 |
Hindu lower OBC | 23 | 71 | 6 |
Hindu Dalits | 36 | 53 | 11 |
Hindu Adivasis | 24 | 70 | 5 |
Muslims | 86 | 6 | 8 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Madhya Pradesh, the BJP’s nationalist narrative, combined with its welfare outreach, played an effective role in helping the party clean sweep the state.
Party | Uttar Pradesh | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 36 | -28 | 43.7 | -9.1 |
INDA[9] | 43 | 37 | 43.2 | 18.8 |
BSP | 0 | -10 | 9.4 | -9.9 |
Others | 1 | 1 | 3.7 | 0.2 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Caste and community vote share (%) in UP:
INDIA | NDA | BSP | Others | |
Upper caste | 16 | 79 | 1 | 4 |
Yadav | 82 | 15 | 2 | 2 |
Kurmi-Koeri | 34 | 61 | 2 | 3 |
Other OBCs | 34 | 59 | 3 | 4 |
Jatav Dalits | 25 | 24 | 44 | 7 |
Non-Jatav Dalits | 56 | 29 | 15 | 1 |
Muslims | 92 | 2 | 5 | 1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Uttar Pradesh (UP) threw up, possibly, the harshest surprise for the BJP. The state delivered heavy defeats to the BJP and prevented the party from reaching the majority mark of 272 seats at the national level. Of the 62 Lok Sabha seats that the BJP had won from the state in 2019, it lost 24 to the Samajwadi Party and 5 to the Congress. The state handed defeat to big BJP leaders like Smriti Irani from Amethi, and Maneka Gandhi from Sultanpur, while delivering a landslide victory to Rahul Gandhi from Rae Bareli and a victory with much reduced margins to PM Modi from Varanasi. While BSP drew a blank, Dalit leader, Chandrashekhar Azad emerged victorious in Nagina constituency. The most talked about setback in the UP result was the BJP defeat in Muslim-majority Faizabad constituency (which houses Ayodhya) to the Samajwadi Party.
The BJP suffered defeats in western and central UP, with the sharp polarization between Jats and Rajputs in western UP working to the disadvantage of the party. It seems that allying with the RLD – to offset the effects of farmer protests and women wrestlers – has backfired for the BJP in western UP, where the Rajputs and Thakurs felt betrayed by the party’s tilt towards the Jats and Gurjars. BJP’s Sanjeev Balyan accused the RLD of undercutting the BJP. At the same time, Sangeet Som, a BJP Thakur leader, also clashed with Jat leader, Mr. Balyan. The region saw intense discontent within the BJP’s Rajput/Thakur cadre who felt disgruntled by the special treatment being meted out to the late entrants among Jats and Gurjars. Out of 26 seats in the region, the BJP won only 13 seats, down from the 18 seats it had won in 2019, with the biggest upset coming from Muzaffarnagar.
The narrative of the Opposition centered around issues like inflation, unemployment and caste census. Importantly, the Opposition was able to effectively play caste politics and peddled the narrative that if BJP returns to power with a majority, it will change the Constitution and the reservation system assured to lower castes. The BJP could not do much to counter this narrative, except pay lip service to the Constitution. The party did start mobilization around Hindutva and nationalism, but this came too late. Putting BJP on the backfoot, allowed the Opposition to set the agenda first.
The Samajwadi Party was also smart in ticket distribution. Having meticulously cultivated the PDA alliance (pichde, Dalits, Alpsankhyak/backwards and minorities), the party gave tickets to OBC and Dalit candidates, while fielding only five Yadavs, as the SP’s Muslim-Yadav base was assured. The special outreach towards Dalits, and OBCs, including Kurmis, Koeris and Nishads helped the party. For BJP, the most damaging performance was the failure to get non-Jatav Dalit votes, which was mainly responsible for the party’s defeat in UP.
Another reason for the blow suffered by the BJP in UP was the botched-up ticket distribution. Much to the disgruntlement of the party cadre, many sitting MPs of the party – who had not kept in touch with the ground – were renominated by the party. This led to a defeat of 26 sitting MPs form the BJP. Further, reports that the central BJP leadership had interfered too much with the state, in attempts to sideline the role of Yogi Adityanath, exacerbated internal political tussles within the BJP.
South:
Party | Andhra Pradesh[10] | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 21 | 18 | 53.5 | 7.1 |
INDIA | 0 | 0 | 3.2 | 1.8 |
YSRCP | 4 | -18 | 39.5 | -9.6 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 3.9 | 0.8 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Andhra Pradesh:
TDP+JSP | BJP | YSRCP | |
Upper caste | 27.8 | 5.6 | 55.6 |
Reddy | 29.6 | 5.6 | 62 |
Kamma | 64 | 4 | 32 |
Kapu | 47.2 | 15.1 | 28.3 |
Golla and Kuruma | 47.5 | 3.4 | 44.1 |
Goud | 57.1 | 19 | 23.8 |
Other BCs | 43.3 | 14.3 | 35.7 |
Madiga | 52 | 4 | 44 |
Mala | 41.5 | 9.2 | 47.7 |
Other SCs | 38.5 | 11.5 | 46.2 |
STs | 40.7 | 14.8 | 25.9 |
Muslims | 32.4 | 4.2 | 53.5 |
Christians | 33.3 | 3.7 | 55.6 |
Others | 47.1 | 15.9 | 25.5 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
The primary drivers behind the TDP-JSP-BJP alliance in Andhra Pradesh were the Kapus and the Backward Classes. The alliance one 21 Lok Sabha seats and 164 assembly seats. Jagan Mohan Reddy’s YSRCP has been reduced to 11 assembly seats and 4 Lok Sabha seats.
Party | Karnataka[11] | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 19 | -7 | 51.7 | -9.4 |
INDIA | 9 | 8 | 45.4 | 13.5 |
Others | 0 | 1 | 2.9 | -4.1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Karnataka:
Congress | NDA | Others | |
Upper caste | 22 | 71 | 7 |
Vokkaliga | 56 | 44 | – |
Lingayat | 20 | 76 | 4 |
Other OBCs | 31 | 66 | 3 |
Dalits | 66 | 33 | 1 |
Adivasi | 44 | 56 | – |
Muslim | 92 | 8 | – |
Others | 41 | 56 | 4 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Karnataka, while Congress’ support base came from Vokkaliga, Dalits and Muslims, BJP’s garnered widespread support among upper castes, Lingayats, other OBCs and Adivasis. Further, the Congress performed well among women (10 percentage point lead) and older voters, while BJP performed well among men (10 percentage point lead) and younger voters. The gender divide may have been impacted adversely for BJP due to the JD (S)’s Prajwal Revanna rape case.
Party | Kerala | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
LDF | 1 | 1 | 33.4 | -0.6 |
UDF | 18 | 0 | 45.1 | -0.9 |
NDA | 1 | 1 | 19.2 | 4.4 |
Others | 0 | -2 | 2.3 | -2.9 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Party | Tamil Nadu | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
INDIA | 39 | 3 | 46.9 | -3.3 |
NDA | 0 | 0 | 17.4 | 8.5 |
AIADMK+ | 0 | -1 | 23 | 1.7 |
Others | 0 | -2 | 12.7 | -7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Tamil Nadu:
Congress | DMK+ | BJP | BJP+ | AIADMK | |
Upper caste | 12 | 26 | 13 | 7 | 27 |
OBCs | 10 | 28 | 13 | 8 | 15 |
Dalits | 13 | 29 | 12 | 4 | 19 |
Muslims | 25 | 47 | – | – | 29 |
Christians | 12 | 28 | 18 | 3 | 20 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
The performance of the DMK-led alliance in Tamil Nadu is the first time since 1991 that a Dravidian party has registered back-to-back landslide victories in Lok Sabha elections. Even the Congress, an ally of DMK, won in all the 10 constituencies that it had contested. However, despite not winning a single seat and in a state where politics for more than half a century has been dominated by Dravidian parties, the BJP made impressive inroads in terms of vote share. It is undeniable that the BJP worked hard over the past two years under the leadership of Mr. Annamalai, whose yatra covered every single constituency in the state. However, the party has, yet, to mobilize any particular social group and its vote share remains evenly divided among various groups.
Party | Telangana | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
INDIA | 8 | 5 | 40.5 | 10.6 |
NDA | 8 | 4 | 35.2 | 15.3 |
BRS | 0 | -9 | 16.6 | -24.7 |
AIMIM | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0.2 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 4.8 | -1.3 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Caste/community wise vote share (%) in Telangana:
Congress | BJP | BRS | AIMIM | Others | |
Upper caste | 29 | 53 | 16 | – | 2 |
OBC | 38 | 42 | 17 | – | 4 |
SC | 45 | 24 | 21 | – | 11 |
ST | 58 | 29 | 9 | – | 4 |
Muslims | 33 | 4 | 11 | 42 | 11 |
Others | 47 | 25 | 23 | – | 5 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In Telangana, the BJP and Congress were neck-to-neck, although the overall gain of the Congress was more in terms of vote share. The BRS was badly damaged, losing nearly 25% of the vote share and not getting any seat. In the state, while BJP’s core vote base centers around upper castes and OBCs which have shifted to the BJP from the BRS, Congress has made tremendous inroads among SCs and STs, besides getting a third of Muslim votes despite the competition by Owaisi-led AIMIM.
Party | Puducherry | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 0 | 0 | 35.8 | 4.4 |
INDIA | 1 | 0 | 52.8 | -3.5 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 11.4 | -1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
North-East:
Party | Arunachal Pradesh | Assam[12] | Manipur | |||||||||
Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | |||||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 2 | 0 | 48.5 | -18.1 | 11 | 2 | 46.3 | 1.6 | 0 | -2 | 35.4 | -23.4 |
INDIA | 0 | 0 | 30.4 | 9.4 | 3 | 0 | 40.9 | 5.2 | 2 | 2 | 47.6 | 14.7 |
Others | 0 | 0 | 21.1 | 8.7 | 0 | -2 | 12.7 | -7 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 8.7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Party | Meghalaya | Nagaland | Tripura | |||||||||
Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | Seats won | Vote (%) | |||||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
NDA | 0 | -1 | 24.3 | -5.9 | 0 | -1 | 46.1 | -5.1 | 2 | 0 | 70.9 | 17.7 |
INDIA | 1 | 0 | 34.1 | -14.2 | 1 | 1 | 52.8 | 4.7 | 0 | 0 | 23.9 | -1.4 |
Others | 1 | 1 | 41.7 | 20.2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 5.2 | -16.3 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Party | Mizoram | |||
Seats won | Vote (%) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
MNF | 0 | -1 | 28.5 | -16.4 |
NDA | 0 | 0 | 6.8 | 1.1 |
INDIA | 0 | 0 | 20.1 | 20.1 |
Others | 1 | 1 | 44.6 | -4.8 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
Rural-Urban divide:
Areas | NDA (vote share %) | INDIA (vote share %) | Others (vote share %) | |||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
Urban | 49.1 | -1.2 | 35 | 7.6 | 15.9 | -6.4 |
Semi-urban | 42.1 | -1 | 36.6 | 10.7 | 21.2 | -9.8 |
Semi-rural | 41.8 | 2.5 | 37 | 8.9 | 21.2 | -11.4 |
Rural | 43.9 | -2.2 | 36.5 | 8.8 | 19.6 | -6.5 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
In terms of the rural-urban divide, the NDA saw the most substantial losses among the rural voters. It lost vote share in urban areas as well. The INDI Alliance, on the other hand, performed well across both rural as well as urban areas, seeing a significant rise in its vote share. Issues like unemployment and price rise may have caused discontent in rural as well as urban areas. Food inflation may have been a significant issue.
The SC-ST factor:
NDA (vote share %) | INDIA (vote share %) | Others (vote share %) | ||||
2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | 2024 | 2019 (+/-) | |
SC | 42.8 | 1.8 | 38 | 12.4 | 19.2 | -14.2 |
ST | 45.5 | -1.3 | 38.5 | 7.2 | 16 | -5.9 |
General | 44.8 | -0.7 | 38.6 | 11.1 | 16.6 | -10.4 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
While the NDA barely made any improvement in its vote share among Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and General category, the INDIA made massive gains across all categories, especially SCs.
Examining BJP’s Underperformance
Many reasons have been attributed to BJP’s losses in these elections. They range from low voter turnouts to an extremely long-drawn election during a heat wave to botched-up ticket distribution due to internal politicization within the party in key states. Many factors, thus, contributed to BJP’s loss, which are examined below as follows:
First, the 2024 general election were the second longest in the history of Independent India, with longest election being the first election held in 1951-52. The election spanned a total of 44 days from after the mid of April to early June over a period of seven phases. Held in the middle of one of the worst episodes of heatwaves the country has witnessed, the duration acted as a great dampener, both for the electorate as well as the political leaders who were campaigning. This was visible in the extremely low voter turnouts in key states of Hindi heartland, especially Uttar Pradesh.
Source: The Indian Express (2024)
While the BJP’s overconfident promise of crossing 400 seats had made many traditional supporters complacent, those who took this messaging otherwise – such as Dalits and Muslims – thinking that achieving 400 seats would enable it to change the Constitution, came out in large numbers to vote against the ruling coalition. Thus, the core BJP vote-base did not turn out to vote in as large numbers as in 2019 election.
Second, as has been assessed by BJP and RSS insiders, the overconfidence and arrogance of the ruling party played a key role in its decline. The entrapment of the leaders in a social media bubble compromised their ability to remain in touch with the ground level. The micro-level mobilization of the cadre was also not seen to the same extent as in the past two general elections. Further, not just the common citizens, but even the RSS and BJP workers were increasingly finding it difficult to get in touch with not just Ministers, but even MPs and MLAs. This has, to an extent, created a perception of rising corruption, isolationist attitude and inability to get work done.
Third, the polarization along caste and community lines played a major role in BJP’s underperformance.
Congress: Vote (%) in 2024 | Congress: change from 2019 (+/-) (%) | Congress allies: Vote (%) in 2024 | Congress allies: change from 2019 (+/-) (%) | BJP: Vote (%) in 2024 | BJP: change from 2019 (+/-) (%) | BJP allies: Vote (%) in 2024 | BJP allies: change from 2019 (+/-) (%) | |
Hindu upper caste | 14 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 53 | 0 | 7 | -1 |
Hindu upper OBC | 20 | 5 | 15 | 6 | 39 | -2 | 9 | -2 |
Hindu lower OBC | 18 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 49 | 1 | 9 | -1 |
Hindu Dalits | 19 | -1 | 13 | 8 | 31 | -3 | 5 | -2 |
Hindu Adivasis | 23 | -8 | 8 | 2 | 48 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
Muslims | 38 | 5 | 27 | 15 | 8 | -1 | 2 | 1 |
Christians | 25 | -14 | 7 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 14 | 9 |
Sikhs | 30 | -9 | 2 | 1 | 10 | -1 | 1 | -19 |
Other minorities | 19 | 6 | 12 | 5 | 31 | -1 | 14 | 10 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024)
From the voting shares across castes and communities, there has been some fragmentation of the Hindu vote which has worked to the advantage of the Congress and its allies. However, broadly, the BJP has managed to protect its core vote base among upper caste Hindus, OBCs and Adivasis and prevented losing the Dalit vote too much. The state of UP saw a greater fragmentation of BJP’s core vote base in favour of the Opposition, thereby affecting the party badly. While Hindu OBCs and Adivasis have solidly stood behind the BJP, there has been a shift of upper castes and Dalits towards the Opposition as well. This shift was more marked among the Dalits, who became highly insecure of reservation being taken away from them through Constitutional changes in case BJP comes back with a huge majority. The Opposition played its Constitution-centric narrative well in this election, especially in states like UP and Rajasthan, which saw greatest fragmentation in BJP votes.
Fourth, one of the biggest factors contributing to the decline of the BJP is the internal politics within the party organization. This was visible in terms of two trends – the increasing role of the high command which verged on arbitrary decision-making and backfired at state level and attempts by the BJP high command to marginalize the role of the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSS), the BJP’s ideological parent organization.
The case of Uttar Pradesh – which is single handedly responsible for preventing the BJP from reaching majority, is a testament to both these trends. The pre-election decision-making process showed attempts by the high command, led by the central BJP leadership, to marginalize Yogi Adityanath’s decisions. Underneath such friction was the attempt to personally cut Yogi down to size due to his rising popular appeal within UP and beyond. The list of candidates sought to be fielded by Yogi in UP was rejected by the central BJP leadership, including in Faizabad (which houses Ayodhya) in favour of sitting MPs. This was despite the complaints and discontent against many sitting MPs. This move massively backfired, resulting in losses for the BJP and a lot of discontent among the cadre.
Further, Yogi is also seen as being close to the RSS. Not only was he appointed as UP’s Chief Minister at the RSS’s behest, but also, after the 2024 election debacle, had a long meeting with the RSS chief to take stock. In this election, the central BJP leadership attempted to play smart with the RSS, with many central leaders claiming that the BJP no longer needs the support of the RSS. Such lack of unity has considerably disillusioned the party cadre, created confusion and impaired local-level mobilization.
Finally, this election has brought to the fore the limitations of nationalist Hindu consolidation. The wave of nationalism and Hindutva that was visible during the last two general elections was greatly diluted this time. In key states of the Hindi heartland, this dilution was visible in the division of the Hindu vote-bank, primarily along caste lines, even as Muslim religious polarization continued unabated. The BJP was also slow in realizing this. It realized what was happening after two phases were already over. By the time its campaign picked up momentum around core Hindutva issues, considerable damage had already been done.
Prior to that, the BJP’s campaign was focused on the self-aggrandizing agenda of crossing 400 seats with ease and around issues like vikas/development. Much like the ‘India Shining’ campaign of BJP spectacularly backfired in 2004, the present government’s campaign of making India a developed economy by 2047 and of making larger themes like ‘amrit kaal’ center around the pitch of material prosperity and welfare also backfired this time.
In the initial pre-election months, the ruling party had rightly come up with the theme focusing on ‘women, youth, farmers and the poor’ as the four main castes. This was done to counter the caste-based divisive mobilization unleashed by the Opposition in the wake of the Bihar caste census. It could have been a very effective instrument to counter the polarizing impact of the Opposition’s campaign, had it been integrated into the larger theme of Hindutva and nationalism, the core ideas behind the BJP’s political existence. However, instead of doing this, the party ended up diluting this theme by linking it to the toothless ‘development’ narrative.
While the Prime Minister linked development to the myriad welfare schemes offered by his party and to statistics which showed the trends in poverty alleviation under the BJP, results on the ground showed the opposite picture that in those constituencies where multidimensional poverty declined due to government programmes, BJP took a hit while Congress doubled its seat tally. Of the constituencies that saw a decline in poverty since 2015-16, the BJP lost 63 seats compared to the 2019 elections (Das, 2024). The recent results show that not only is there no correlation between implementation of successful welfare schemes and political mobilization, but also raise questions about the risk in making such a petty, counterproductive theme a central pitch to mobilize people.
The Only Way Out
“When difficulties besiege you, know that the Divine Grace is with you” – The Mother (CWM 14, P. 96).
The decline of the BJP in these elections has been a big moment of introspection for the party. This was visible in the days and weeks immediately following the results, when despite successfully forming the government at the Centre, the BJP, especially the Prime Minister, had been withdrawn and circumspect. The BJP is rightly taking this victory as a defeat and has gone into introspection. Despite the blow suffered, the demeanour with which the Prime Minister comported himself has been commendable, representing both strength and maturity. From a wider perspective, it is important to see behind this unique victory-cum-defeat the clear hand of Divine Providence. It is only the fortunate few who receive the blows of the Divine and are directed onto the correct path. Such blows are not a sign of defeat, but rather of Divine Grace. It, therefore, calls for utmost respect for the person who has been at the receiving end. In an activity like politics, such an explicit intervention is especially rare to find. It is, perhaps, common to see a world leader going astray, drunk with the illusion of power, but it is rare to find a powerful world leader humbled and yet not finished, shown a path to emerge stronger from adversity. More than anything else, this should be the first takeaway from the present election. This shows how actively the Divine Grace is working to lead the country, beyond inexplicable human factors.
The circumspect victory speech given by the Prime Minister in the aftermath of the election results reflected the psychological churning that may have been taking place. Unlike the victory speech of 2019, where the Prime Minister focused on the vapid slogan of development and secularism (sabka saath, sabka vikas, sabka vishwas), in the present address, the focus was on working towards fulfilling the commitments made to the nation. It is, perhaps, time that the ruling political class of India attempts to realize that the deeper, spiritual destiny of the country lies in being the ‘vishwaguru’ and not ‘vikaspurush.’ The two can never be identical. For, vikas – utilitarian development defined in terms of the lowest common denominator signifying fulfillment of material necessities and never-ending wants, involving appeasement and glorification of the basest values in society – can never make India a Vishwaguru. Such a plank of development is the very antithesis of spiritual self-discovery.
The ruling political class rightly invokes ancient Indian culture and traditions but does not realize that it is not merely the symbolic body, but the true spirit of this culture that needs to be revived. This is the ancient Aryan spirit that Sri Aurobindo had spoken about. Writing about it, Sri Aurobindo had said, “It is only the Indian who can believe everything, dare everything, sacrifice everything. First, therefore, become Indians. Recover the patrimony of your forefathers. Recover the Aryan thought, the Aryan discipline, the Aryan character, the Aryan life. Recover the Vedanta, the Gita, the Yoga. Recover them not only in intellect or sentiment but in your lives. Live them and you will be great and strong, mighty, invincible and fearless. Neither life nor death will have any terror for you. Difficulty and impossibility will vanish from your vocabularies” (CWSA 8, PP. 27-28).
This is the real meaning behind India being the Vishwaguru. The idea that India can lead the world by excelling in the imitation of Western model of development has been one of the most powerfully self-destructive ideas that the present ruling political class of the country, despite all its good intentions, finds difficult to shed. The present election results should, therefore, be seen not as a rejection of the core nationalist-cultural ideology of the BJP – as many commentators have hastened to project – but as a Divine rejection and course correction of the unnatural attempts to marry Hindu spiritual revival to the contrary idea of material selfishness.
Bibliography
CWM 14. (1997). Words of the Mother-II. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust.
CWSA 8. (1997). Karmayogin. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust.
Das, A. (2024, June 20). The Indian Express. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/lok-sabha-seats-poverty-declined-bjp-congress-doubled-tally-9403893/
Lokniti-CSDS Post Poll Survey (2024). (2024). Chennai: The Hindu.
The Indian Express. (2024). Phase-wise turnout. New Delhi: The Indian Express.
- Excluding Shiv Sena and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) which were undivided in 2019. ↑
- In Goa, INDIA included Congress and Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). ↑
- In Gujarat, INDIA included Congress and AAP. ↑
- In Maharashtra, NDA included BJP, Shinde-led Shiv Sena (SHS) and Ajit Pawar’s NCP. INDIA included Congress, Sharad Pawar-led NCP (SP) and Uddhav Thackrey-led Shiv Sena (SHS (UBT)). ↑
- INDIA in West Bengal consisted of INC and Left parties. INC gained one seat, while Left parties got zero seats. The vote-shares were INC (4.7%); CPI (0.2%); CPI-M (5.7%); AIFB (0.2%); RSP (0.2%). ↑
- In Bihar, NDA had many constituents. BJP received 12 seats with 20.4% vote; JD (U) received 12 seats with 18.6% vote; LJP (RV) received 5 seats with 6.5% vote; HAMS received 1 seat with 1.1% vote; RLM received 0 seats with 0.6% vote.INDIA also had many parties. INC received 3 seats with 9.3% vote; RJD received 4 seats with 22.4% vote; CPI-ML-L received 2 seats with 3% vote; VSIP received 0 seats with 2.8% vote; CPI-M received 0 seats with 0.8% vote; CPI received 0 seats with 1.3% vote. ↑
- In Delhi, INDIA consisted of AAP and INC. Both received 0 seats. The vote share of INC was 18.9%, while that of AAP was 24.1%. ↑
- In Jharkhand, NDA consisted of BJP and AJSUP. BJP received 8 seats with 44.5% vote share, while AJSUP received 1 seat with 2.7% vote share.INDIA consisted of INC, JMM, CPI-ML-L and RJD. INC received 2 seats with 19.2% vote, JMM received 3 seats with 14.7% vote, CPI-ML-L received 0 seats with 2.3% vote and RJD received 0 seats with 2.9% vote. ↑
- INDIA, in Uttar Pradesh, consisted of INC, SP and AITC. INC received 6 seats with 9.5% vote share. SP received 37 seats with 33.6% vote share. AITC received 0 seats with 0.5% vote share. ↑
- In Andhra Pradesh, NDA consisted of BJP, TDP and Pawan Kalyan’s JnP. BJP received 3 seats with 11.4% vote; TDP received 16 seats with 37.7% vote; JnP received 2 seats with 4.3% vote. ↑
- In Karnataka, NDA consisted of BJP and JD (S). BJP received 17 seats with 46.1% vote. JD (S) received 2 seats with 5.6% vote. ↑
- In Assam, NDA included three parties. BJP secured 9 seats with 37.4% vote; AGP secured 1 seat with 6.5% vote; UPPL secured 1 seat with 2.4% vote. ↑